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Title: The Ethics

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Posting Date: May 28, 2009 [EBook #3800]

Release Date: February, 2003

First Posted: September 26, 2001

Last Updated: December 11, 2017

Language: English

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Produced by Tom Sharpe. HTML version by Al Haines.

The Ethics

(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)

by

Benedict de Spinoza

Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes

PART I. CONCERNING GOD.

DEFINITIONS.

I. By that which is self--caused, I mean that of which the

essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only

conceivable as existent.

II. A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be

limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a

body is called finite because we always conceive another greater

body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a

body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is

conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a

conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV. By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as

constituting the essence of substance.

V. By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that

which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than

itself.

[1] "Affectiones"

VI. By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a

substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each

expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its

kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite

attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,

contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves

no negation.

VII. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the

necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is

determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is

necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by

something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of

existence or action.

VIII. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is

conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of

that which is eternal.

Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal

truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be

explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may

be conceived without a beginning or end.

AXIOMS.

I. Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in

something else.

II. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be

conceived through itself.

III. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;

and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is

impossible that an effect can follow.

IV. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the

knowledge of a cause.

V. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the

one by means of the other; the conception of one does not

involve the conception of the other.

VI. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII. If a thing can be conceived as non--existing, its essence

does not involve existence.

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof.--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

PROP. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have

nothing in common.

Proof.--Also evident from Def. iii. For each must exist in

itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the

conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

PROP. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the

cause of the other.

Proof.--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one

cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,

therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).

Q.E.D.

PROP. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from

the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the

substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof.--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in

something else (Ax. i.),--that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing

is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and

its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the

understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one

from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see

Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications. Q.E.D.

PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more

substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof.--If several distinct substances be granted, they must

be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of

their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications

(Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it

will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an

identical attribute. If by the difference of their

modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its

modifications (Prop. i.),--it follows that setting the

modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is

truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one

substance different from another,--that is (by Prop. iv.), there

cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.

Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Proof.--It is impossible that there should be in the universe

two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have

anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.

iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be

produced by the other. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that a substance cannot be

produced by anything external to itself. For in the universe

nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as

appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.). Now (by the last

Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,

therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.

Q.E.D. This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the

contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external

cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its

cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be

substance.

PROP. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

Proof.--Substance cannot be produced by anything external

(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause--that

is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence

belongs to its nature.

PROP. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.--There can only be one substance with an identical

attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);

its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or

infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it

would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which

would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be

two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd

(Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation, and

infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given

nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance

is necessarily infinite.

Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult for those who think

about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them

by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.

vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the

modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and

are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence

they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe

in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of true causes, make

complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as

men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;

and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,

also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,

readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long

as they do not know how passions originate in the mind. But, if

people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no

doubt about the truth of Prop. vii. In fact, this proposition

would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism. For, by

substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is

conceived through itself--that is, something of which the

conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas

modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a

conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the

thing in which they exist. Therefore, we may have true ideas of

non--existent modifications; for, although they may have no

actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their

essence is so involved in something external to themselves that

they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth

substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in

their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.

Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and

distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not

sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he

said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it

was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if

anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same

as saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of

absurdity. It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the

existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And

we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there

is but one such substance. I think that this may profitably be

done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the

demonstration, we must premise:----

1. The true definition of a thing neither involves nor

expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined. From

this it follows that----

2. No definition implies or expresses a certain number of

individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature

of the thing defined. For instance, the definition of a triangle

expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it

does not imply any fixed number of triangles.

3. There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a

cause why it should exist.

4. This cause of existence must either be contained in the

nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated

apart from such definition.

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual

things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the

existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less. For

example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's

sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have

had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of

these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of

human existence in general; we must also show why there are

exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be

assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause

cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true

definition of man does not involve any consideration of the

number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of

these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must

necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may

lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of

several individuals must have an external cause. And, as it has

been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of

substance, existence must necessarily be included in its

definition; and from its definition alone existence must be

deducible. But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,

iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;

therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same

nature. Q.E.D.

PROP. IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the

number of its attributes (Def. iv.).

PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be

conceived through itself.

Proof.--An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of

substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,

therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.). Q.E.D.

Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in

fact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the

other--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two

entities, or two different substances. For it is the nature of

substance that each of its attributes is conceived through

itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed

simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;

but each expresses the reality or being of substance. It is,

then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one

substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each

and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that

its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its

attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.

Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite

being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite

attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and

infinite essence.

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to

distinguish different substances, let him read the following

propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the

universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a

sign would be sought in vain.

PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,

of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,

necessarily exists.

Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God

does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.

But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily

exists.

Another proof.--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason

must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its

non--existence--e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be

granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not

exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from

existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must

either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be

external to it. For instance, the reason for the non--existence

of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it

would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence

of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its

nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle

does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the

order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must

follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is

impossible that it should exist. So much is self--evident. It

follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or

reason be granted which prevents its existence.

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the

existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must

certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a

reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the

very nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from

another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same

nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But

substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God

(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or

to destroy his existence.

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine

existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine

nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn

from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To

make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and

supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of

God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be

assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God

necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Another proof.--The potentiality of non--existence is a

negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence

is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily

exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more

powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously

absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being

absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either

in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see

Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely

infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists.

Q.E.D.

Note.--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's

existence à posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily

followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence

does not follow à priori. For, as the potentiality of existence

is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases

in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength

for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as

God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,

and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many

who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as

they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from

external causes. Of such things, they see that those which

quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into existence--quickly

also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of

accomplishment--that is, not so easily brought into

existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated.

However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here

show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly,

goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of

universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I

need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which

come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of

substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any

external cause. Things which are produced by external causes,

whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever

perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of

their external cause; and therefore their existence arises

solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from

their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by

substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence

of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is

nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing

does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.

Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we

cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the

existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of

God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and

involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his

existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question

is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately

attentive reader.

PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which

it would follow that substance can be divided.

Proof.--The parts into which substance as thus conceived would

be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they

will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will

necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self--caused, and (by

Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so

that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one

substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd. Moreover, the parts

(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and

the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be

conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be

absurd. If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the

parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the whole

substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature

of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is

absurd.

PROP. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Proof.--If it could be divided, the parts into which it was

divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite

substance, or they would not. If the former, we should have

several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is

absurd. If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely

infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also

absurd.

Corollary.--It follows, that no substance, and consequently no

extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

Note.--The indivisibility of substance may be more easily

understood as follows. The nature of substance can only be

conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else

can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)

involves a manifest contradiction.

PROP. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Proof.--As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no

attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied

(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any

substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained

by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same

attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,

besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be

conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have

to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this

proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God no substance can be

granted or conceived. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by

Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and

that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already

indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

Corollary II.--It follows: 2. That extension and thought

are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents

(affectiones) of the attributes of God.

PROP. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can

be, or be conceived.

Proof.--Besides God, no substance is granted or can be

conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which

is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Def.

v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;

wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only

through it be conceived. But substances and modes form the sum

total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing

can be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.

Note.--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and

mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have

strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been

said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise

reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this

they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body

a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a

certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate

such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile

by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they

show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart

from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom

the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;

thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of

their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at

any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.

viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything

other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that

besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we

drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the

infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more

fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all

start from the following points:----

Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,

as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be

infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God. This

they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or

two. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be

conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be

either finite or infinite. If the former, then infinite

substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If

the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another

infinite, which is also absurd.

Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,

it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would

equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part

measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve

times as great as the other.

Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn

two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance

apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the

distance between the two lines will be continually increased,

until at length it changes from definite to indefinable. As

these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity

as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance

must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain

to the nature of God.

The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme

perfection. God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely

perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance,

insofar as it is divisible, is passive. It follows, therefore,

that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.

Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who

by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the

divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto. However, I

think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered

their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the

hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such

a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)

to be absurd. Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all

these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now

discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion

that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the

notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that

an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts

therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:

infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of

finite parts. This is exactly what we have already proved (in

Prop. xii.). Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in

reality recoiled upon themselves. If, from this absurdity of

theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended

substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like

a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,

and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to

deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to

the circumference are equal. For, taking extended substance,

which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible

(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it

is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can

be multiplied and divided.

So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of

points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be

infinitely divided. Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert

that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it

would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface

of lines, and a line of points. This must be admitted by all who

know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who

deny the possibility of a vacuum. For if extended substance

could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why

should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others

remaining joined together as before? And why should all be so

fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum? Surely in the

case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one

can exist without the other, and can remain in its original

condition. As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature

(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to

prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be

distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is

substance cannot be divided.

If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally

so prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is

conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially,

as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by

the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented

in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall

find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but

if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and

conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we

shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is

infinite, one, and indivisible. This will be plain enough to all

who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,

especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the

same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as

we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are

distinguished, not really, but modally. For instance, water, in

so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts

to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is

extended substance; from this point of view it is neither

separated nor divisible. Further, water, in so far as it is

water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is

substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.

I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in

fact, founded on the same assumption as the first--namely, that

matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed

of parts. Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be

considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God

(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could

receive its modifications. All things, I repeat, are in God, and

all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the

laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly

show) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in

nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other

than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the

Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is

granted to be infinite and eternal. But enough of this for the

present.

PROP. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow

an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things

which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Proof.--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who

remembers that from the given definition of any thing the

intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily

follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing

defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the

definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in

proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more

reality. Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite

attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite

essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its

nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which

can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must

necessarily follow. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that God is the efficient

cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite

intellect.

Corollary II.--It also follows that God is a cause in himself,

and not through an accident of his nature.

Corollary III.--It follows, thirdly, that God is the

absolutely first cause.

PROP. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and

is not constrained by anyone.

Proof.--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from

the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,

solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things

absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved

(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived

but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist;

outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to

act. Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,

and is not constrained by anyone. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--It follows: 1. That there can be no cause

which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the

perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

Corollary II.--It follows: 2. That God is the sole free

cause. For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature

(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole

necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the

sole free cause. Q.E.D.

Note.--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,

as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have

said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power,

should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him. But

this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,

that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its

three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;

or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is

absurd.

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this

proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's

nature. I know that there are many who think that they can show,

that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;

for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can

attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in

ourselves. Further, although they conceive God as actually

supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring

into existence everything which he actually understands, for they

think that they would thus destroy God's power. If, they

contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he

would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,

would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to

asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates

nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute

exercise of will, to create. However, I think I have shown

sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme

power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is,

all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of

ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as

from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for

eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right

angles. Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from

all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state

of activity. This manner of treating the question attributes to

God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect. For,

otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an

infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able

to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,

according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render

himself imperfect. Wherefore, in order to establish that God is

perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,

that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power

extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most

repugnant to God's omnipotence.

Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the

will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain

to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some

significance quite different from those they usually bear. For

intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,

would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human

intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with

them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence

between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly

constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks. This I will

prove as follows. If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it

cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,

posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,

inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality

(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the contrary, the truth and formal

essence of things is as it is, because it exists by

representation as such in the intellect of God. Wherefore the

intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute

God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their

essence and of their existence. This seems to have been

recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,

God's will, and God's power, are one and the same. As,

therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,

both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ

from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its

existence. For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely

in the quality which the latter gains from the former.

For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,

but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,

therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but

must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of

one of them cease, the existence of the other will not

necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be

destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be

destroyed also. Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of

the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ

from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in

respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause

both of the essence and the existence of our intellect;

therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to

constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in

respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in

anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before. The

reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone

can easily see.

PROP. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause

of all things.

Proof.--All things which are, are in God, and must be

conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,

Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.

This is our first point. Further, besides God there can be no

substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to

God. This is our second point. God, therefore, is the

indwelling and not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

Proof.--God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)

necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains

to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its

definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.). Further,

by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.

iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other

words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should

be involved in the attributes of substance. Now eternity

appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in

Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the

attributes, and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is also evident from the manner in

which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is

evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,

like his essence, is an eternal truth. Further (in Prop. xix. of

my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the

eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.

PROP. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the

same.

Proof.--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are

eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses

existence. Therefore the same

attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at

the same time his eternal existence--in other words, that which

constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his

existence. Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one

and the same. Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.--Hence it follows that God's existence, like his

essence, is an eternal truth.

Coroll. II--Secondly, it follows that God, and all the

attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be

changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be

changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed from

true to false, which is absurd.

PROP. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of

any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in

other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

Proof.--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition

to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow

from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the

same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or

duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the

attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to

be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its

nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,

it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as

finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is

not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted

the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);

therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not

constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)

must necessarily exist.

We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the

idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally

follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for

it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,

the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if

the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,

anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any

example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from

the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the

said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first

point.

Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of

the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For

if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of

the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,

for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,

and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be

about not to exist.

Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist

unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond

the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the

latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to

exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of

God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,

thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed

therefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or

anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of

some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but

through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.

Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of

anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's

absolute nature.

PROP. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so

far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily

and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist

necessarily and as infinite.

Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of

the preceding one.

PROP. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as

infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature

of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a

modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

Proof.--A mode exists in something else, through which it must

be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in

God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode

is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must

necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of

God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the

infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)

eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely. A

mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must

follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either

immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some

modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said

attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily

and as infinite.

PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not

involve existence.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of

which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is

self--caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of

things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in

existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of

the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist,

or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see

that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,

it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must

be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence

appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence

of things, but also of their essence.

Proof.--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the

essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by

Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is

absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.

Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.

For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the

essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their

existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,

in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This

will be made still clearer by the following corollary.

Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of

the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God

are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears

from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular

manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that

which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to

act.

Proof.--That by which things are said to be conditioned to act

in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is

obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God

by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.

xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is

plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not

been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part

of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is

absurd.

PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act

in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

PROP. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is

finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be

conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and

action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and

has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in

its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be

conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also

is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to

infinity.

Proof.--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been

thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,

Coroll.).

But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,

cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;

for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any

attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It

must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as

the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for

substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.

and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the

attributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes,

in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite

and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it

must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by

God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are

modified by some modification which is finite, and has a

conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this

cause or this modification (for the reason by which we

established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be

conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a

conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the

same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.

Q.E.D.

Note.--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,

namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute

nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,

nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it

follows:--1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those

things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after

his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot

either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.

xxiv. Coroll.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote

cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing

these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what

follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote cause, we

understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.

But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that

without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

PROP. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all

things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular

manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Proof.--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot

be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists

necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the

divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently

(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the

divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way

conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the

cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.

xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as

conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).

If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is

impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition

themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is

impossible, and not contingent, that they should render

themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by

the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also

to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing

that is contingent. Q.E.D.

Note.--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what

we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura

naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say

to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,

from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature

viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,

and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of

substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other

words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,

in so far as he is considered as a free cause.

By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which

follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the

attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of

God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,

and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

PROP. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function

infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the

modifications of God, and nothing else.

Proof.--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in

other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect

in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in

nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save

God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in

God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore

the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must

comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,

and nothing else. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or

infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to

passive nature and not to active nature.

Proof.--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute

thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from

other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)

requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by

Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which

expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so

conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be

conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive

rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of

thinking. Q.E.D.

Note.--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,

admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:

but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of

what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of

understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For

we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of

the act of understanding.

PROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a

necessary cause.

Proof.--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like

intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,

nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause

other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,

and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must

also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his

being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his

possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal

essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be

conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by

which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def.

vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or

constrained cause. Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act

according to freedom of the will.

Coroll. II.--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect

stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and

rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be

conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular

manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by

which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.

And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite

number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be

said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite

number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying

that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more

appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands

in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which

we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,

and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular

manner.

PROP. XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by

God in any manner or in any order different from that which has

in fact obtained.

Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God

(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist

and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.). If things, therefore,

could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned

to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have

been different, God's nature would also have been able to be

different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that

different nature also would have perforce existed, and

consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.

This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd. Therefore things

could not have been brought into being by God in any other

manner, &c. Q.E.D.

Note I.--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at

noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things

contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall

attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the

words necessary and impossible.

A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence

or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing

necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or

from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is

said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or

definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause

is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but

a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation

to the imperfection of our knowledge.

A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or

does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it

does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt

concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes

us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or

impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.

Note II.--It clearly follows from what we have said, that

things have been brought into being by God in the highest

perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a

most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in

God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its

contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just

shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been

brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to

God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute

to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.

I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and

will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply

because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very

different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They

assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also

convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly

weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject

such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,

but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is

no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.

xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,

that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of

God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things

could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a

different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what

our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely

on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If

it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.

Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all

eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be

convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no

such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely

from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never

could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist

before his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it is

said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had

ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and

her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in

God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change his

decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature

and her order, different from those which he has ordained--in

other words, if he had willed and conceived something different

concerning nature--he would perforce have had a different

intellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But

if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a

different will, without any change in his essence or his

perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the

decrees which he has made concerning created things, and

nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will

concerning things created and their order are the same, in

respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.

Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that

God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as

they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's

essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a

different actual intellect and a different will, his essence

would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at

first, if things had been brought into being by God in a

different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and

will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have

been different, which is absurd.

As these things could not have been brought into being by God

in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as

the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection

of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to

believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were

in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he

had understood them.

But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor

imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be

called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the

will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it

about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,

and vice versâ. What is such an assertion, but an open

declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he

wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should

understand things differently from the way in which he does

understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height of

absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its

employers, as follows:--All things depend on the power of God.

In order that things should be different from what they are,

God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God's

will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly

demonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither can

things be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects

all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that

they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth

than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all

things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter

persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not

depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,

or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another

name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter

absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first

and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of

their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting

such wild theories.

PROP. XXXIV. God's power is identical with his essence.

Proof.--From the sole necessity of the essence of God it

follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all

things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.). Wherefore the power of God, by

which he and all things are and act, is identical with his

essence. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,

necessarily exists.

Proof.--Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)

be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it

necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect

does not follow.

Proof.--Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in

a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,

(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given

conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,

therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.

Q.E.D.

APPENDIX:

In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties

of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:

that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;

that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;

that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without

him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all

things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or

absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.

I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the

prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my

demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,

which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the

understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained

it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these

misconceptions before the bar of reason.

All such opinions spring from the notion commonly

entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,

namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God

himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said

that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship

him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,

why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so

prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,

lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about

good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and

confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is

not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of

the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a

starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,

that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all

have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they

are conscious of such desire. Herefrom it follows, first, that

men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their

volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,

of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.

Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that

which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to

pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of

events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having

no cause for further doubt. If they cannot learn such causes

from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering

themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them

personally to bring about the given event, and thus they

necessarily judge other natures by their own. Further, as they

find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist

them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,

eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for

yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding

fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means

for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that

they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think

they have cause for believing, that some other being has made

them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they

cannot believe them to be self--created; but, judging from the

means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they

are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe

endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted

everything for human use. They are bound to estimate the nature

of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in

accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that

the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind

man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor. Hence

also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according

to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God

might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course

of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and

insatiable avarice. Thus the prejudice developed into

superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this

reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain

the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that

nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to

man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,

and men are all mad together. Consider, I pray you, the result:

among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some

hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they

declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at

some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in

their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by

infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of

pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their

inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such

contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were

ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of

ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning

and start afresh. They therefore laid down as an axiom, that

God's judgments far transcend human understanding. Such a

doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the

human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished

another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and

properties of figures without regard to their final causes.

There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides

mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed

to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge

of the truth.

I have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is

no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in

view, and that final causes are mere human figments. This, I

think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and

foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and

also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in

fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that

everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with

the utmost perfection. However, I will add a few remarks, in

order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly. That

which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versâ:

it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that

which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect. Passing

over the questions of cause and priority as self--evident, it is

plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most

perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which

requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in

that respect, more imperfect. But if those things which were

made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his

end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the

first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.

Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:

for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something

which he lacks. Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a

distinction between the object of want and the object of

assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for

the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation. They are

unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God

himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore

driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those

things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he

desired them.

We must not omit to notice that the followers of this

doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final

causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their

theory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to

ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of

exhibiting their doctrine. For example, if a stone falls from a

roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate

by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;

for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how

could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent

circumstances) have all happened together by chance? Perhaps you

will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was

blowing, and the man was walking that way. "But why," they will

insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very

time walking that way?" If you again answer, that the wind had

then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day

before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had

been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was

the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"

So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at

last you take refuge in the will of God--in other words, the

sanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of

the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the

causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been

fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural

skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt

another.

Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and

strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,

and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as

an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the

interpreters of nature and the gods. Such persons know that,

with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only

available means for proving and preserving their authority would

vanish also. But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my

third point.

After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is

created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as

the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to

themselves, and to account those things the best of all which

have the most beneficial effect on mankind. Further, they were

bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature

of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,

cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that

they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and

blame, sin and merit.

I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human

nature; the former I will briefly explain here.

Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God

they have called good, everything which hinders these objects

they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not

understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any

way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their

imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that

there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things

and their own nature. When phenomena are of such a kind, that

the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of

imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say

that they are well--ordered; if the contrary, that they are

ill--ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily

imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to

confusion--as though there were any order in nature, except in

relation to our imagination--and say that God has created all

things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing

imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God

foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it

should be most easily imagined. If this be their theory, they

would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an

infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and

very many others which confound its weakness. But enough has

been said on this subject. The other abstract notions are

nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is

differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant

as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that

everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,

according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,

healthy or rotten and corrupt. For instance, if the motion which

objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,

the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary

motion be excited, they are styled ugly.

Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are

styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,

full--flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,

rough or smooth, &c.

Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,

sound, or harmony. In this last case, there are men lunatic

enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in

harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded

themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to

harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone

judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather

mistakes for things the forms of his imagination. We need no

longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we

have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human

bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they

differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;

what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what

is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on. I need not

further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the

subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well

known. It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;

everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as

palates." All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things

according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than

understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as

mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I

have urged.

We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly

given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate

the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the

imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were

entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them

entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all

arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily

rebutted.

Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a

necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there

so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things

corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,

confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have

said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be

reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not

more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human

senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to

mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men,

that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but

this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of

every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more

strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to

suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an

infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.

Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if

there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily

dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.

Part II.

ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

PREFACE

I now pass on to explaining the results, which must

necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and

infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part

i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an

infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead

us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind

and its highest blessedness.

DEFINITIONS

DEFINITION I. By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain

determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is

considered as an extended thing. (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,

Coroll.)

DEFINITION II. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing

that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,

and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;

in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself

without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is

formed by the mind as a thinking thing.

Explanation.--I say conception rather than perception, because

the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in

respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an

activity of the mind.

DEFINITION IV. By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so

far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the

object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

Explanation.--I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark

which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and

its object (ideatum).

DEFINITION V. Duration is the indefinite continuance of

existing.

Explanation.--I say indefinite, because it cannot be

determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or

by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of

the thing, but does not take it away.

DEFINITION VI. Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.

DEFINITION VII. By particular things, I mean things which are

finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several

individual things concur in one action, so as to be all

simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so

far, as one particular thing.

AXIOMS

I. The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that

is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or

that man does or does not exist.

II. Man thinks.

III. Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of

the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same

individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea

can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

IV. We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

V. We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and

modes of thought.

N.B. The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.

xiii.

PROPOSITIONS

PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking

thing.

Proof.--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are

modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature

of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses

the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved

in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.

Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,

which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.

vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we

are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For, in

proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more

thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or

perfection. Therefore a being, which can think an infinite

number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,

in respect of thinking, infinite. As, therefore, from the

consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,

thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the

infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

PROP. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an

extended thing.

Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of

the last.

PROP. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his

essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his

essence.

Proof.--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an

infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same

thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,

and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all

that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).

Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and

in God alone. Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop. xv.)

Note.--The multitude understand by the power of God the free

will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which

latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent. For

it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to

reduce them to nothing. Further, the power of God is very often

likened to the power of kings. But this doctrine we have refuted

(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown

(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as

that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it

follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),

that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same

necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways. We

further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is

identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as

impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive

him as non--existent. If we might pursue the subject further, I

could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to

God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the

multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a

negation of power. However, I am unwilling to go over the same

ground so often. I would only beg the reader again and again, to

turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from

Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning,

unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of

God with the human power and right of kings.

PROP. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of

things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

Proof.--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the

attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).

Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore the

idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in

infinite ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.

PROP. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only

in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far

as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas

both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own

as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things

perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this

Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea

of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily

therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because

he is the object of his own idea. Wherefore the actual being of

ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.

It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of

ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.

xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the

nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore

(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute

of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect

of any attribute save thought. Therefore the actual being of

ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a

thinking thing, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in

so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they

are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any

other attribute.

Proof.--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without

any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each

attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of

any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only

in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes

they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any

other. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence the actual being of things, which are not

modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because

that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things

represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their

particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same

necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from

the attribute of thought.

PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the

order and connection of things.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For

the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of

the cause, whereof it is an effect.

Corollary.--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his

realized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from the

infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),

follows without exception in the same order and connection from

the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).

Note.--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what

has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be

perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence

of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:

consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one

and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,

now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the

idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in

two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by

those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the

things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle

existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is

also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through

different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the

attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or

under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one

and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following

in either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the

idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a

circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the

actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a

proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again

through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we

consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order

of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the

attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things

as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of

nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in

the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they

are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he

consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present

explain my meaning more clearly.

PROP. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do

not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in

the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes

are contained in the attributes of God.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the last; it is

understood more clearly from the preceding note.

Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,

except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of

God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,

except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when

particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they

are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they

are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,

through which they are said to continue.

Note.--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on

this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,

which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,

inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to

illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such

that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the

rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;

thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet

none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far

as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these

rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are

comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from

this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of

these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the

idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of

those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the

remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is

caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as

he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually

existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected

by a third idea, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is

an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes

(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus

(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only

as he is a thinking thing. But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)

in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as

he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he

is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so

on to infinity. Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by

Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of

causes. Therefore of a given individual idea another individual

idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that

idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in

so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of

any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he

has the idea of the object.

Proof.--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its

idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he

is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by

another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by

Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the

same as the order and connection of things. The knowledge,

therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object

will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.

Q.E.D.

PROP. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the

essence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute the

actual being[2] of man.

[2] "Forma"

Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence

(Part i., Prop. vii.). If, therefore, the being of substance

appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man

would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,

consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd

(II. Ax. i.). Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which

it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same

nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is

not that which constitutes the actual being of man. Again, the

proposition is evident from the other properties of

substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,

immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is

constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.

For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to

the essence of man. That essence therefore (by i. 15) is

something which is in God, and which without God can neither be

nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),

or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned

manner.

Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be

conceived without God. All men agree that God is the one and

only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their

existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in

respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect

to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many assert, that that, without which a

thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that

thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God

appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created

things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more

probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the

cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the

proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which

should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the

order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be

last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place

what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are

considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to

the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to

the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in

mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the

knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are

no help towards understanding the divine nature. So that it is

hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict

themselves freely.

However, I pass over this point. My intention here was only

to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing

cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:

individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God

does not appertain to their essence. I said that "I considered

as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,

the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the

thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the

thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be

conceived." (II. Def. ii.)

PROP. XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being

of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually

existing.

Proof.--The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)

is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely

(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.

Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is

given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior

in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).

Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human

mind. But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II.

viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must

therefore be the idea of something actually existing. But not of

an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must

always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an

absurdity. Therefore the first element, which constitutes the

actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually

existing. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of

the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human

mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has

this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far

as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so

far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we

say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he

constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as

he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of

another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in

part or inadequately.

Note.--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and

will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;

I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and

not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the

end.

PROP. XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,

which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human

mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of

the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea

constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in

that body without being perceived by the mind.

Proof.--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,

the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in

so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said

object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind

of anything. Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object

constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is

necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of

the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of

the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words

the mind perceives it.

Note.--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly

to be understood from II. vii., which see.

PROP. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind

is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which

actually exists, and nothing else.

Proof.--If indeed the body were not the object of the human

mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in

God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but

in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that

is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body

would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the

idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore the object of

the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as

it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other

object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as

nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.

xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,

which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but

(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea. Wherefore the object of our

mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is

united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind

and body. However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately

or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the

nature of our body. The propositions we have advanced hitherto

have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to

other individual things, all of which, though in different

degrees, are animated.[3] For of everything there is necessarily

an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as

there is an idea of the human body; thus whatever we have

asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be

asserted of the idea of everything else. Still, on the other

hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from

the other, one being more excellent than another and containing

more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent

than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.

[3] "Animata"

Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind

differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is

necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of

the human body. What this nature is, I am not able here to

explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,

that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in

proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing

many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is

the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for

forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions

of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies

concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it

is the object for distinct comprehension. We may thus recognize

the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the

cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,

and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following

propositions, deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore I

have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my

present statements. In order to do so, I must premise a few

propositions concerning the nature of bodies.

AXIOM I. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

AXIOM II. Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,

sometimes more quickly.

LEMMA I. Bodies are distinguished from one another in

respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in

respect of substance.

Proof.--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,

self--evident. That bodies are not distinguished in respect of

substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought

out still more clearly from I. xv, note.

LEMMA II. All bodies agree in certain respects.

Proof.--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the

conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).

Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,

and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.

LEMMA III. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to

motion or rest by another body, which other body has been

determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third

again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which

(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to

motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be

determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely

(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in

motion or at rest. And this body again can only have been set in

motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to

motion or rest. This third body again by a fourth, and so on to

infinity. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in

motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other

body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a

state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self--evident.

For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at

rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,

I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is

at rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,

this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no

other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at

rest. If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so

long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything

concerning it, except that it is in motion. If A is

subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result

of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to

continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted

from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external

cause determining A to a state of rest.

Axiom I.--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another

body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected

and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be

moved in different modes, according to the difference in the

nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different

bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.

Axiom II.--When a body in motion impinges on another body at

rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to

continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in

the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving

body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line

of motion of incidence and the same plane.

So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,

which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and

rest, quickness and slowness. We now pass on to compound bodies.

Definition.--When any given bodies of the same or different

magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or

if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that

their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain

fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that

together they compose one body or individual, which is

distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.

Axiom III.--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a

compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,

they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved

from their position; consequently the individual will, with

greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form.

Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,

are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small

superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion

among one another, are called fluid.

LEMMA IV. If from a body or individual, compounded of

several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same

time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take

their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,

without any change in its actuality (forma).

Proof.--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of

substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an

individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but

this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will

(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,

will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance

and in respect of mode. Q.E.D.

LEMMA V. If the parts composing an individual become greater

or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same

mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still

preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be

changed.

Proof.--The same as for the last Lemma.

LEMMA VI. If certain bodies composing an individual be

compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,

for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they

be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication

in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its

own nature without any change of its actuality.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the individual

is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we

spoke of as its actual being.

LEMMA VII. Furthermore, the individual thus composed

preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at

rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as

each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication

with other parts as before.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the definition of an

individual prefixed to Lemma iv.

Note.--We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected

in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.

Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies

only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and

rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple

character. If, however, we now conceive another individual

composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find

that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without

losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts

would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)

each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker

or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its

motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If

we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of

individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be

affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their

actuality. We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive

the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all

bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the

individual as a whole. I should feel bound to explain and

demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a

special treatise on body. But I have already said that such is

not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it

enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.

POSTULATES

I. The human body is composed of a number of individual

parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself

extremely complex.

II. Of the individual parts composing the human body some

are fluid, some soft, some hard.

III. The individual parts composing the human body, and

consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of

ways by external bodies.

IV. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a

number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,

regenerated.

V. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an

external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes

the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression

thereupon of the external body which impels it.

VI. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange

them in a variety of ways.

PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great

number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable

of receiving a great number of impressions.

Proof.--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in

very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many

ways of affecting external bodies. But (II. xii.) the human

mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the

human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of

things, and is so in proportion, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the

human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of

ideas.

Proof.--The idea constituting the actual being of the human

mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is

composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But

there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part

whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore

(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these

numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is

affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human

body, and also the nature of the external body.

Proof.--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,

follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the

nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of

Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.

iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of

every mode, in which the human body is affected by external

bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external

body. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind

perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the

nature of its own.

Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we

have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our

own body than the nature of external bodies. I have amply

illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.

PROP. XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which

involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will

regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present

to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to

exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for so long as the

human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human

mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body--that is (by

the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually

existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.

In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but

postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the

external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will

regard the external body as actually existing, until it is

affected, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external

bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even

though they be no longer in existence or present.

Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the

human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they

change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii.,

after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in

a different manner from that which they followed before such

change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new

surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be

refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled

towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they

will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human

body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again

take cognizance--that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard

the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the

fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces

by their own spontaneous motion. Wherefore, although the

external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,

be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them

as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.

Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,

that we regard as present many things which are not. It is

possible that the same result may be brought about by other

causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated

one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out

the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the

truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which

rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be

controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human

body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).

Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly

understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of

Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the

idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The

former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and

only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter

indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature

of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body

lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even

though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual

phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the

ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call

the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of

things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say

that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in

order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the

mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind

does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as

it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the

existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If

the mind, while imagining non--existent things as present to it,

is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this

power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its

nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of

imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def.

vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.

PROP. XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or

more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines

any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.

Proof.--The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,

because the human body is affected and disposed by the

impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is

affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said

external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so

disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,

it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and

the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the

other. Q.E.D.

Note.--We now clearly see what Memory is. It is simply a

certain association of ideas involving the nature of things

outside the human body, which association arises in the mind

according to the order and association of the modifications

(affectiones) of the human body. I say, first, it is an

association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of

things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the

nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the

human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve

the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say,

secondly, that this association arises according to the order and

association of the modifications of the human body, in order to

distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from

the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things

through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.

And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from

the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the

thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;

for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a

Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,

which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,

nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man

has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the

man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the

fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to

another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things

in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the

tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of

a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought

of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of

a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c. Thus every man

will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has

been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images

of things in this or that manner.

PROP. XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does

not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications

whereby the body is affected.

Proof.--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the

human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as

he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing

actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body

stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,

continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas

is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);

this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded

as affected by the ideas of very many particular things. Thus

God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in

so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so

far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by

II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.

But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far

as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human

mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently

(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing;

therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in

God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to

God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human

body.

Proof.--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore

(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of

thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of

the human mind (II. xi.). Further, this idea or knowledge of the

mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but

in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual

thing (II. ix.). But (II. vii.) the order and connection of

ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;

therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is

referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of

the body. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the

same way as the mind is united to the body.

Proof.--That the mind is united to the body we have shown from

the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and

xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be

united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner

as the mind is united to the body. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from

what we have said in the note to II. vii. We there showed that

the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),

are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute

of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the

idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,

which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,

thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are

in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same

power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that

is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality

(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of

thought without reference to the object; if a man knows

anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at

the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to

infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.

PROP. XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications

of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.

Proof.--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God

in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,

as the ideas of the said modifications. This is proved in the

same way as II. xx. But the ideas of the modifications of the

body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far

as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the

ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the

knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they

will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not

only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such

modifications. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as

it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

Proof.--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in

God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same

manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body. But since (II.

xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is

(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not

referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the

human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind

referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the

human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human

mind thus far has no knowledge of itself. Further the ideas of

the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the

nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),

they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge

of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but

(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human

mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has

knowledge of itself. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate

knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

Proof.--The parts composing the human body do not belong to

the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate

their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.

after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as

individuals without relation to the human body. The parts of the

human body are highly complex individuals (Post. i.), whose

parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in

any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the

latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after

Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.

iii.) the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,

inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea

of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the

order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.). We may affirm

the same thing of each part of each individual composing the

human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the

human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many

ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the

human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the

nature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi.

Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge

of the human body. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does

not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

Proof.--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the

human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as

that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.

But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has

no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is

in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the

idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to

the said external body. Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the

external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the

modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the

modification of the human body does not involve an adequate

knowledge of the external body. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body

as actually existing, except through the ideas of the

modifications of its own body.

Proof.--If the human body is in no way affected by a given

external body, then (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human

body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the

idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in

any manner perceive its existence. But, in so far as the human

body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far

(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--In so far as the human mind imagines an external

body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

Proof.--When the human mind regards external bodies through

the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it

imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine

external bodies as actually existing. Therefore (by II. xxv.),

in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an

adequate knowledge of them. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body

does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Proof.--Every idea of a modification of the human body

involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human

body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.). But,

inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected

in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body,

in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not

clear and distinct, but confused.

Proof.--The ideas of the modifications of the human body

involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies

(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human

body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes

(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,

consequently, the human body as a whole are affected. But (by

II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as

also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so

far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so

far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas. These ideas of

modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind

alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,

confused ideas. Q.E.D.

Note.--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind

is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in

itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the

idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the

modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred

to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.

PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the

human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human

mind.

Proof.--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.

xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,

in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is

(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind

adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not

adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not

involve an adequate knowledge thereof.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it

perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an

adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,

of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not

know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the

modifications of body (II. xxiii.). It only perceives its own

body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only

perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so

far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate

knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.

xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a

fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and

note). Q.E.D.

Note.--I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but

only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of

external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common

order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from

without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to

regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from

within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,

to understand their points of agreement, difference, and

contrast. Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it

regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.

PROP. XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the

duration of our body.

Proof.--The duration of our body does not depend on its

essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.

xxi.). But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate

by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and

operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these

last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.

The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of

nature, or the constitution of things. Now, however a thing may

be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,

in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as

he has the idea of the human body only. (II. ix. Coroll.)

Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God

very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting

the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this

knowledge is very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the

duration of particular things external to ourselves.

Proof.--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be

conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a

fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must

likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity. (I.

xxviii.) As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from

this common property of particular things, we have only a very

inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a

similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular

things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge

of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that all particular things are

contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of

their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must

understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I.

xxxiii., Note i.) For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing

is contingent.

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,

are true.

Proof.--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with

their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are

all true. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes

them to be called false.

Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive

mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality

of falsehood. Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.

xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).

Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to

be called false. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and

perfect, is true.

Proof.--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and

perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea

is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the

essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such

an idea is true. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,

which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

Proof.--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them

to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in

simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to

be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for

ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in

the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or

confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.

Note.--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists

in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light

on the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are

mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up

of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the

causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom,

therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their

actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the

will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond

thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none

of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign

dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke

either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun,

we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;

this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact

that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true

distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards

learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of

the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;

for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are

ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of

our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said

body is affected thereby.

PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same

necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

Proof.--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they

are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)

adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,

except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and

xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,

follow by the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,

above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not

constitute the essence of any particular thing.

Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it

constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,

the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either

exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.

Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it

constitute the essence of any particular thing. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which

are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived

except adequately.

Proof.--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and

which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the

whole. I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the

idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.

Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,

and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the

human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the

nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that

is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be

adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in

so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.

Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A

adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as

it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any

external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.

Q.E.D.

Corollary--Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or

notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree

in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be

adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

PROP. XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the

human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human

body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in

the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

Proof.--If A be that, which is common to and a property of the

human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human

body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each

external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of

A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of

the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given

external bodies. Let it now be granted, that the human body is

affected by an external body through that, which it has in common

therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve

the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the

idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property

A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the

idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he

constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.

Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to

perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has

more in common with other bodies.

PROP. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which

are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident. For when we say

that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are

therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that

an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not

in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by

the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as

he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Note I.--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,

which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our

ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or

notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this

method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more

useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at

all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all

men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who

are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are

ill--founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called

secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on

which they are founded, and other points of interest connected

with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the

subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another

treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by

too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything

necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence

are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,

Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the

human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming

a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the

II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number

be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this

number of images, of which the body is capable of forming

distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become

entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident

(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind

can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body

can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite

confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies

confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as

it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of

Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact

that images are not always equally vivid, and from other

analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for

the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to

consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms

represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar

causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,

horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many

images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the

human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed

utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small

differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and

their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in

which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by

them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said

individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses

by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of

particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to

imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,

bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all

men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the

point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and

which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance,

those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of

man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect

stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other

attribute, will form a different general image of man, for

instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two--footed animal

without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,

everyone will form general images of things according to the

habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,

who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed

of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

Note II.--From all that has been said above it is clear, that

we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)

From particular things represented to our intellect

fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses

(II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by

the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4]

[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]

(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard

certain words we remember things and form certain ideas

concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things

(II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding

things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.

(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and

adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,

xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of

the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,

as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we

will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an

adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of

God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will

illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.

Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to

the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without

hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the

product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the

rule which they received from a master without any proof, or

because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or

by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the

seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property

of proportionals.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For

instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the

fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we

infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,

which the first bears to the second.

PROP. XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of

falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily

true.

Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the

foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate

and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only

source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore, we assigned to the

second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are

adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.

xxxiv.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not

knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true

from the false.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident. He, who knows how

to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea

of true and false. That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the

true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

PROP. XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that

he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing

perceived.

Proof.--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,

in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind

(II. xi. Coroll.). Let us suppose that there is in God, in so

far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,

A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be

referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,

whereof the proof is of universal application). But the idea A

is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed

through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must

be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.

Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,

which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate

idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time

have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that

is, obviously, he must be assured. Q.E.D.

Note.--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by

the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing

proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a

true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest

certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression

for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one,

indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is

something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of

thinking--namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask,

can know that he understands anything, unless he do first

understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a

thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can

there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a

standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and

darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

I think I have thus sufficiently answered these

questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false

idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a

true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea

(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);

consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any

advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes

it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure,

that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These

questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently

answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is

plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to

the latter as being is to not--being. The causes of falsity I

have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the

note. From what is there stated, the difference between a man

who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made

apparent. As for the last question--as to how a man can be sure

that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just

pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises

from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with

its object--in other words, that truth is its own standard. We

may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is

part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);

therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as

necessarily true as the ideas of God.

PROP. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things

as contingent, but as necessary.

Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly

(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves--that

is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that it is only through our

imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the

future or the past, as contingent.

Note.--How this way of looking at things arises, I will

briefly explain. We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)

that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even

though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which

exclude their existence and presence. Further (II. xviii.), we

showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two

external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards

imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway

remember the other--that is, it will regard both as present to

itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence

and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from

the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than

others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us

suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in

the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that

today he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from

II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he

will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the

sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other

words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his

imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he

will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that

is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation

to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the

evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by

imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past

time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other

evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on

the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening

sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the

child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,

not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and,

with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first

one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,

neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This

wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination

be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in

relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may

imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time

present, past, or future.

Corollary II.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive

things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis

specie).

Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as

contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.). Reason perceives this

necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it

is in itself. But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very

necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the

nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.

We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.

xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.

xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:

which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,

under a certain form of eternity.

PROP. XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular

thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and

infinite essence of God.

Proof.--The idea of a particular thing actually existing

necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the

said thing (II. viii.). Now particular things cannot be

conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they

have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the

attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas

must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the

attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and

infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Note.--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,

existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a

certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of

existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they

follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal

necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.). I am speaking, I repeat, of

the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in

God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by

another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force

whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from

the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).

PROP. XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of

God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

Proof.--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and

whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea

thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),

will involve God's eternal and infinite essence. Wherefore,

that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence

of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the

whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the

eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.

xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and

external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually

existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate

knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the

eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God,

and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer

many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that

third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,

and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to

speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as

they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine

God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the

name God with images of things that they are in the habit of

seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they

are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many

errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do

not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says

that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its

circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly

attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that

assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in

calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and

another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do

not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that

they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the

paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in

error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I

lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a

neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.

Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do

not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret

the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly

contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of

the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider

mistaken and absurd in their opponents.

PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will;

but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which

has also been determined by another cause, and this last by

another cause, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.

xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.

xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute

faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it

must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by

another cause, and this last by another, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind

no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.

Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either

entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,

such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.

Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to

this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to

this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul. The cause

which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in

the Appendix to Part I. But, before I proceed further, I would

here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the

faculty, not the desire. I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby

the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,

wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.

After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general

notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular

instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether

volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.

We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any

affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as

it is an idea, involves. On which subject see the following

proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should

suggest itself. For by ideas I do not mean images such as are

formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but

the conceptions of thought.

PROP. XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and

negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,

involves.

Proof.--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive

or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this

or that affirmation, and this or that negation. Now let us

conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking

whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a

triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation

involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without

the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived. It is the same

thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as

it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B. Further,

this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea

of a triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be

conceived, without the idea of a triangle. Again, this idea of a

triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its

three interior angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore,

and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be

conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation

belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing

besides. What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have

selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,

that it is nothing but an idea. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Will and understanding are one and the same.

Proof.--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the

individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note). But a

particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same

(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are

one and the same. Q.E.D.

Note.--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly

assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity

consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas

which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea,

inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we

say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he

has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,

but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is

false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his

imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note). Thus, although the

man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say

that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive

(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully

explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and

I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced

against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,

I have thought it worth while to point out some of the

advantages, which follow therefrom. I say "some," for they will

be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth

part.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to

make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of

the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is

further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and

words, whereby we signify things. These three--namely, images,

words, and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused

together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,

and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely

necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for

philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those

who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by

contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas

of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not

ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of

our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate

pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not

see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an

affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with

ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that

they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or

deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who

reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no

wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly

understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not

consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of

words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no

wise involve the conception of thought.

These few words on this subject will suffice: I will

therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised

against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those,

who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,

and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for

their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the

understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an

increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or

negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do

not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their

faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from

the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.

Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us

especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment

before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed

by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he

perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not

therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not

deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does

exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by

experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and

different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be

objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more

reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to

need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power

than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have,

however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than

another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so

also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this

also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and

the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from

free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are

equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he

perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall

seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather

than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then

determine his own action, and would consequently possess the

faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections

might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence

everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the

task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as

possible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will

has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding

be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will

has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of

forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition

should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:

for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an

infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot

affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the

same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an

infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an

infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,

that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,

consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be

urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive

them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of

perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have

already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring

it about that we should understand an infinite number of other

entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater

understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that

which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.

We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we

explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which is

common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or

universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be

wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself

into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for

what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an

infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a

free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that

anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that

he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.

Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a

perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point,

let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing

else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the

horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything

which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will

necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to

doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof. We

have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I

do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,

while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his

judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it

about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that

he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we

suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as

actual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's

imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.

xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of

perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of

a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the

mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would

regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons

for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless

the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which

precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind

perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is

inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the

existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the

subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third

objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is

predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is

common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate

essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the

abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the

same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting

the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular

affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For

instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,

differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much

as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal

power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and

to affirm that that which is false is true. These two

affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to

one another as being and not--being; for there is nothing

positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of

falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when

we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason

and abstractions with realities. As for the fourth objection, I

am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium

described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,

a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from

him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such

an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I

answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be

considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider

children, fools, madmen, &c.

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this

doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered

from what has been said. The doctrine is good,

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the

decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so

much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and

more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely

tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest

happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of

God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid

us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true

estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God

with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as

for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the

service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct

ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which

are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it

shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or

frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the

eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from

the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two

right angles.

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches

us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to

be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be

content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any

womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the

guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as

I will show in Part III.

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the

commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and

led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do

whatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of

this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a

close. I think I have therein explained the nature and

properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,

considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient

clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many

excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary

to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.

PART III.

ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be

treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural

phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to

conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a

kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows

nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,

and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute

human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in

general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which

accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,

abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human

mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked

upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent

men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),

who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way

of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one,

so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the

emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their

restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he

believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,

strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at

the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain

to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he

accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own

great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the

present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or

deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will,

doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of

human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth

with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as

repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However,

such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be

set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and

everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;

that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to

pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and

always the same; so that there should be one and the same method

of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,

through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of

hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow

from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to

certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and

possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the

properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself

affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and

strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I

employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the

mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the

same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and

solids.

DEFINITIONS

I. By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect

can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an inadequate or

partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its

effect cannot be understood.

II. I say that we act when anything takes place, either within

us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that

is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature

something takes place within us or externally to us, which can

through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.

On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something

when that something takes place within us, or follows from our

nature externally, we being only the partial cause.

III. By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby

the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,

aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.

N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these

modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I

call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.

POSTULATES

I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its

power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other

ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or

less.

N.B. This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and

Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.

II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,

retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),

and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.

xvii.).

PROP. I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain

cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is

necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it

is necessarily passive.

Proof.--In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and

some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).

Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in

God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.

Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise

(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he

contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as

he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things. Again,

from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);

of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not

inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as

affected by the given idea (II. ix.). But of that effect whereof

God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is

adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in

question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore our

mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in

certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point.

Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is

adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the

mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together

with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of

such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not

an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the

mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases

necessarily passive; this was our second point. Therefore our

mind, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is more or less

liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate

ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as

it possesses adequate ideas.

PROP. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind

determine body to motion or rest or any state different from

these, if such there be.

Proof.--All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by

virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his

being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.). That,

therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of

thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it

is not body. This was our first point. Again, the motion and

rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been

determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and

absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring

from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of

extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is,

it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought. This

was our second point. Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c.

Q.E.D.

Note.--This is made more clear by what was said in the note to

II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,

conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under

the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or

concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived

under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of

states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in

nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the

mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we

proved II. xii.

Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no

further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is

proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the

question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it

is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in

motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending

solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought. However,

no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the

body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what

the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far

as she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained such

an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can

explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact

that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far

transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things

in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:

these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole

laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.

Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the

body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the

body, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus, when men say that

this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which

latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without

meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are

ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at

it.

But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means

whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,

experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit

state to think, the body remains inert. Moreover, we have

experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or

are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,

we say depend on the mind's decree. But, as to the first point,

I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,

that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted

for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind

simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of

thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I

think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the

mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given

subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for

being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is

the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.

But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the

laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be

able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of

that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the

human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be

capable of building a single temple. However, I have just

pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the

body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration

of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things

being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would

never have believed possible except under the direction of mind:

such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and

wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call

attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses

in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to

repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under

whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow.

As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be

much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they

are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern

anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything

more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many

believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we

moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be

controlled by the thought of something else frequently

remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what

we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be

allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless

such persons had proved by experience that we do many things

which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when

assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the

worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we

are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own

free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely

desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires

to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from

the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he

would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a

garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe

that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they

are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.

Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men

believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious

of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those

actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the

dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and

therefore vary according to the varying state of the body.

Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who

are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;

those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this

way or that. All these considerations clearly show that a mental

decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are

simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call

decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the

attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is

regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the

laws of motion and rest. This will appear yet more plainly in

the sequel. For the present I wish to call attention to another

point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,

unless we have a remembrance of having done so. For instance, we

cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so.

Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or

forget a thing at will. Therefore the freedom of the mind must

in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering

something which it remembers. But when we dream that we speak,

we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we

do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the

body. Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we

seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby

we keep silence when awake concerning something we know. Lastly,

we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,

which we should not dare to do when awake.

Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two

sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?

If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must

necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is

believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination

or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an

idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.

xlix.). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind

by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.

Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or

act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream

with their eyes open.

PROP. III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate

ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on

inadequate ideas.

Proof.--The first element, which constitutes the essence of

the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent

body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many

other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.

xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.). Whatsoever therefore

follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate

cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily

follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea. But

in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is

necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow

solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only

passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas. Q.E.D.

Note.--Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to

the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving

negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,

which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself

without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are

attributed to individual things in the same way that they are

attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be

perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.

PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external

to itself.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the definition

of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not

negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the

thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard

only the thing itself, without taking into account external

causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could

destroy it. Q.E.D.

PROP. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in

the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the

other.

Proof.--If they could agree together or co--exist in the same

object, there would then be in the said object something which

could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is

absurd, therefore things, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours

to persist in its own being.

Proof.--Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of

God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);

that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given

determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;

now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be

destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but

contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its

existence (III. v.). Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so

far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own

being. Q.E.D.

PROP. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to

persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence

of the thing in question.

Proof.--From the given essence of any thing certain

consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any

power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as

determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,

or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it

acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or

endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,

is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in

question. Q.E.D.

PROP. VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist

in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite

time.

Proof.--If it involved a limited time, which should determine

the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that

power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist

beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;

but this (III. iv.) is absurd. Wherefore the endeavour wherewith

a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise,

since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already

exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some

external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.

PROP. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct

ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to

persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this

endeavour it is conscious.

Proof.--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and

inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so

far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the

latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for

an indefinite time (III. viii.). Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is

necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the

modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)

conscious of its own endeavour.

Note.--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is

called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it

is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's

essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those

results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus

been determined to perform.

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,

except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so

far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly

be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.

It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we

strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we

deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be

good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or

desire it.

PROP. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,

cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

Proof.--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated

therein (III. v.). Therefore neither can the idea of such a

thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.

ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing

cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.

xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of

the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it

follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the

endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea,

which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our

mind, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders

the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or

diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.

xiv.

Note.--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,

and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,

sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states

of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.

By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall

signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater

perfection. By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the

mind passes to a lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of

pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call

stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of

pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.

But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are

attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected

than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike

affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to

Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other

primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other

emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I

should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this

part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is

contrary to another. In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the

idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the

existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it

follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,

that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the

fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.

Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of

the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends

on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.

Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its

power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to

affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the

mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the

mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases

to exist. For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the

existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;

therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the

existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but

(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes

the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,

and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the

essence of our mind.

PROP. XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive

those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the

body.

Proof.--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which

involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will

regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and

consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an

external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,

the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature

of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives

things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,

the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of

activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's

power of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus

(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine

such things. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or

hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as

possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the

first--named things.

Proof.--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind

alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or

constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue

to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which

excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as

I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is

diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something

else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:

therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour

to conceive or remember the latter. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from

conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of

itself and of the body.

Note.--From what has been said we may clearly understand the

nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure

accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing

else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We

further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,

and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who

hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.

But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.

PROP. XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at

the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one

of these two, be also affected by the other.

Proof.--If the human body has once been affected by two bodies

at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it

will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.). But the

mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than

the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,

if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been

once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever

it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by

the other.

PROP. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,

pain, or desire.

Proof.--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously

affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor

diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either

increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.). From the

foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is

afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which

(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of

action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which

does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.

xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the

former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but

accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way

also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the

cause of desire. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing

with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not

the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate

it.

Proof.--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that

the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with

the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),

according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or

diminished, &c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the

mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.

Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may

love or hate the same. Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or

hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;

merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. We should

refer to the same category those objects, which affect us

pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other

objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the

next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first

to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to

signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I

think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known

or manifest qualities.

PROP. XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given

object has some point of resemblance with another object which is

wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the

point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said

emotions, we shall still regard the first--named object with love

or hate.

Proof.--The point of resemblance was in the object (by

hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus

(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it

will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and

consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point

of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of

pleasure or pain. Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although

the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not

the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the

first--named object with love or hate. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect

us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing

which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of

pleasure, we shall hate the first--named thing, and at the same

time we shall love it.

Proof.--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause

of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with

this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive

that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is

wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we

shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it

(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.

Q.E.D.

Note.--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two

contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the

emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination

(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from

the other, except as greater differs from less. But we must bear

in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which

give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the

other accidentally. I have done this, in order that they might

be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny

that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an

object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions. The human

body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts

of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.

after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by

one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same

thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different

ways affect one and the same part of the body. Hence we can

easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of

many and conflicting emotions.

PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully

by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing

present.

Proof.--So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,

he will regard that thing as present, even though it be

non--existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as

past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the

image of time past or future (II. xliv. note). Wherefore the

image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether

it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that

is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is

identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or

present. Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,

whether the image be of a thing past or future. Q.E.D.

Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either

have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according

as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has

recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,

or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its

existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which

excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)

the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way

as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally

happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so

long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in

doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the

emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so

constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other

things, until men become assured of the issue.

Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what is

meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and

Disappointment.[5] Hope is nothing else but an inconstant

pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,

whereof we do not yet know the issue. Fear, on the other hand,

is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something

concerning which we are in doubt. If the element of doubt be

removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear

becomes Despair. In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from

the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.

Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past

whereof we have doubted the issue. Disappointment is the Pain

opposed to Joy.

[5] Conscientiæ morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.

PROP. XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is

destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved

he will feel pleasure.

Proof.--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive

those things which increase or help the body's power of activity

(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which

it loves. But conception is helped by those things which

postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered

by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);

therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of

an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the

object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind

pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the

existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental

endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully. He,

therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed

will feel pain, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is

destroyed will also feel pleasure.

Proof.--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those

things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's

power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.

xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the

existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,

which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the

aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects

the mind pleasurably. Thus he who conceives that the object of

his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is

affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected

pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will

be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or

less in the thing loved.

Proof.--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which

postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's

endeavour to conceive the said object. But pleasure postulates

the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in

proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is

(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore

the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental

endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover

pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion

may have been greater in the object of love. This was our first

point. Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it

is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to

the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who

conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,

will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said

emotion is greater or less in the object of love. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects

some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards

that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an

object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred

towards it.

Proof.--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of

our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we

conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or

pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come

to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore

(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object

of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with

love or hatred towards him. Q.E.D.

Note.--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we

may define as pain arising from another's hurt. What term we can

use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.

We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on

another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures

another, we will call Indignation. We must further remark, that

we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown

in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto

regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles

ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval

on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,

contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.

PROP. XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is

painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he

thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel

pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according

as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.

Proof.--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully

affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the

strength of the pain (III. xi. note). Therefore, he (III. xx.)

who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully

affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the

amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred. This

was our first point. Again, pleasure postulates the existence of

the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as

the pleasure is greater or less. If anyone imagines that an

object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception

(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other

words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.

Q.E.D.

Note.--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and

without any mental conflict. For (as I am about to show in Prop.

xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to

himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like

manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary

circumstances. But here we are regarding hatred only.

PROP. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an

object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we

conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall

feel love towards him.

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.

xxii., which see.

Note.--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable

to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so

far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's

hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.

PROP. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and

concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to

affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object. Contrariwise,

we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect

painfully ourselves or the loved object.

Proof.--That, which we conceive to affect an object of our

love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or

painfully (III. xxi.). But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as

far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us

pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it

endeavours to regard them as present. And, contrariwise (III.

xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as

affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm

concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever

we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we

hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,

contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything

which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

Proof.--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the

foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.

Note.--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may

easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,

contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is

called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of

himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with

his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that

fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting

them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to

conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines

his own power of action. Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing

from a man thinking too highly of himself. Again, the pleasure

which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called

over--esteem. Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too

little of a man is called disdain.

PROP. XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is

like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,

to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a

like emotion (affectus).

Proof.--The images of things are modifications of the human

body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to

us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas

involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature

of the external bodies as present. If, therefore, the nature of

the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the

idea which we form of the external body will involve a

modification of our own body similar to the modification of the

external body. Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to

ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will

express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.

Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be

affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like

emotion. If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we

shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not

similar, emotion. Q.E.D.

Note I.--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to

pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is

referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else

but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we

conceive that others have the like desire.

Corollary I.--If we conceive that anyone, whom we have

hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something

similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.

If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the

same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Proof.--This is proved from the last proposition in the same

manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

Corollary II.--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because

its misery affects us painfully.

Proof.--If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice

in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Corollary III.--We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,

a thing which we pity.

Proof.--That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,

affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);

therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which

removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in

other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we

shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall

endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity. Q.E.D.

Note II.--This will or appetite for doing good, which arises

from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is

called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from

compassion. Concerning love or hate towards him who has done

good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like

ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

PROP. XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive

to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy

whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to

conduce to pain.

Proof.--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that

which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other

words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as

possible as present or actually existing. But the endeavour of

the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and

simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power

of action. (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.

Coroll.). Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its

existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the

same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first

point. Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed

to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we

hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.). We shall,

therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy

the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may

not regard it as present; this was our second point. Wherefore

whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive

men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink

from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men

whom we regard without any particular emotion.

Proof.--From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate

anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).

That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel

pleasure or pain at the thing's presence. And so we shall

endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with

pleasure, etc. Q.E.D.

Note.--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely

in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so

eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit

certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it

is generally called kindliness. Furthermore I give the name of

praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of

another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame

to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.

PROP. XXX. If anyone has done something which he conceives as

affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,

accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he

will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has

done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,

he will regard himself with pain.

Proof.--He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure

or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with

pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and

xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby

he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,

that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with

pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other

words, he will regard himself with pleasure. And so mutatis

mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.

Note.--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the

idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the

idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question

will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and

hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ

other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure

accompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style

Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I

mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's

belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure

accompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called

self--complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.

Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,

wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist

solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone

endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives

will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a

vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,

when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.

[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read,

"an internal cause." "Honor" = Gloria.

[8] See previous endnote.

PROP. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates

anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall

thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,

&c. On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from

something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.

Proof.--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves

anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but

we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new

cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we

shall thereupon love it more steadfastly. Again, from the mere

fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall

ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.). If we assume

that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously

love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject

to vacillation (III. xvii. note). Q.E.D.

Corollary.--From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it

follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause

others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself

hates: as the poet says: "As lovers let us share every hope

and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the

other leaves."[9]

[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.

"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;

 Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."

Note.--This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes

and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really

ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone

by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should

live according to his own individual disposition: when such a

desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone

else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all

become mutually hateful.

PROP. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in

something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour

to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain

possession thereof.

Proof.--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another

person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we

shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight

therein. But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be

prevented by another's delight in its object; we shall,

therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.

xxviii.). Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus see that man's nature is generally so

constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies

those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his

own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that

from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that

men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and

ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall

find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more

especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our

life. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it

were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others

laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate

whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of

whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the

images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human

body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by

external causes to act in this or that manner.

PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we

endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love

us in return.

Proof.--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to

conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.). If the

thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it

pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.). In

other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it

about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure

accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),

that it should love us in return. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a

loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our

complacency.

Proof.--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to

bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in

other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure

accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause. Therefore, in

proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected

because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.--that is (III. xi.

and note) the greater will be our pleasure. But when we take

pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something

similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);

therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a

loved object to be affected, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love

joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he

himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards

the loved object and with envy towards his rival.

Proof.--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is

well affected towards him, will be the strength of his

self--approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of

his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as

far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound

to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks

that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.). But this

endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the

loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved

object has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will

for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of

the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his

rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred

towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.

Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved

object. Q.E.D.

Note.--This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy

is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a

wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and

hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.

Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,

in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont

to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and

also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained

towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate

the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably

affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is

compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image

of him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play

in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman

whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not

only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,

being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the

parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks

from her.

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved

with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives

him pain as a lover, as I will now show.

PROP. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once

taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances

as when he first took delight therein.

Proof.--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with

the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of

pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it,

in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other

words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the

same circumstances as when he first took delight therein. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the

aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.

Proof.--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be

missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence. As

he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or

circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he

conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.). Q.E.D.

Note.--This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence

of the object of love, is called Regret.

PROP. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or

love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

Proof.--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of

activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes

or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in

his own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said

endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are

directed to removing that pain. But (by the definition of pain),

in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily

opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore

the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed

to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or

appetite in endeavouring to remove it. Again, since pleasure

(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it

may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by

pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his

desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.

Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain

and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,

appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be

greater in proportion to the hatred or love. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,

so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being

equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,

and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his

former love.

Proof.--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more

of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never

loved it. For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man

endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);

he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by

affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is

greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the

endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his

affection (III. xxxiii.). Now these endeavours are constrained

by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.

xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause

also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love

has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by

hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the

object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater

pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never

loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former

love was greater. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an

injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue

to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the

same law, seek to benefit him.

Proof.--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as

a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to

remove or destroy him. But if anything more painful, or, in

other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater

thereby--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not

carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of

his hate--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury

(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)

will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will

therefore prevail over it, as we asserted. The second part of

this proof proceeds in the same manner. Wherefore he who hates

another, etc. Q.E.D.

Note.--By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all

that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our

longings, whatsoever they may be. By evil, I mean every kind of

pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have

shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because

we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because

we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink

from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,

judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,

what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a

miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of

money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as

glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man

nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing

more painful than another's success. So every man, according to

his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or

useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that

which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is

called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear

whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as

future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.). But if the

evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.

Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the

fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,

fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared

be very great.

PROP. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and

believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate

that other in return.

Proof.--He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will

thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,

with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. But, by

the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him

who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by

some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea

of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.

Q.E.D.

Note.--He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred

will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case

(III. xxv.) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may

also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure

the object of our hate (III. xxxix.). He therefore who conceives

that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause

of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or

fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other

words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I

said above.

Corollary I.--He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates

him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. For, in so

far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is

determined to hate his enemy in return. But, by the hypothesis,

he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to

conflicting hatred and love.

Corollary II.--If a man conceives that one, whom he has

hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from

motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in

kind.

Proof.--He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the

last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will

endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;

he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).

Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury

done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to

repay it in kind. Q.E.D.

Note.--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called

Anger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves

is called Revenge.

PROP. XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and

believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love

that other in return. (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as the

preceding one. See also the note appended thereto.

Note.--If he believes that he has given just cause for the

love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is

what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its

contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated

by another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This

reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him

who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is

called gratitude or thankfulness. It thus appears that men are

much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

Corollary.--He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he

hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love. This is

proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding

proposition.

Note.--If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour

to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty,

especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary

cause for hatred.

PROP. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from

motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the

benefit is received without gratitude.

Proof.--When a man loves something similar to himself, he

endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be

loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.). Therefore he who has

conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which

he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from

the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will

endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or

to regard it as actually existing. But, by the hypothesis, he

conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the

said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.

xix.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can

on the other hand be destroyed by love.

Proof.--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates

him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former

hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.). But if, on the

other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he

will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,

and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his

emotion. In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.

xli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III.

xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion

from which it arises. Therefore, if it be greater than that

which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to

affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better

of it and banish the hatred from his mind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes

into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not

preceded it.

Proof.--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.

of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was

wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving

feels pleasure. To this pleasure involved in love is added the

pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the

pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea

of the former object of hatred as cause.

Note.--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate

anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying

this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he

should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor

long to be ill for the sake of getting well. For everyone will

always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as

far as he can. If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a

man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love

him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him. For

the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the

hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be

continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,

he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he

might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in

such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)

is absurd.

PROP. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself

hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will

hate that person.

Proof.--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him

who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that

anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as

affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain;

consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the

idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he

will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.

xiii. note). Q.E.D.

PROP. XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully

by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if

the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said

stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or

nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the

individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation

whereto he belongs.

Proof.--This is evident from III. xvi.

PROP. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is

destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a

certain pain in us.

Proof.--This is evident from III. xxvii. For in so far as we

conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,

we ourselves feel pain.

Note.--This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary

to II. xvii. Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not

actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is

affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the

remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard

it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing

in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other

things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not

destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the

said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising

from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we

remember that object of hatred. For, as we have said, when the

image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it

involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard

the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it

actually did exist. However, since he has joined to the image of

the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this

determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices

afresh as often as the repetition takes place. This is the cause

of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in

narrating dangers from which they have escaped. For when men

conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are

determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by

the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the

danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure

afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.

PROP. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is

destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain

involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of

another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we

conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.

Proof.--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love

and hatred (III. xiii. note). For pleasure is called love

towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in

so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the

other. When this condition of causality is either wholly or

partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part

vanishes. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to

be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if

it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

Proof.--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)

be perceived through itself without anything else. If,

therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we

shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall

do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the

given emotion. But if the thing which causes the emotion be

conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.

vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of

the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred

towards it will be less. Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be

free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards

anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation

of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.

PROP. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope

or fear.

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.

xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.

Note.--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or

fear are called good or evil omens. Now, in so far as such omens

are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of

hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of

pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them

with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means

towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,

or causes of that which we fear. It follows, further, from III.

xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily

in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we

fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or

below their true value. Hence there have arisen superstitions,

whereby men are everywhere assailed. However, I do not think it

worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from

hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,

that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,

as I will duly explain in the proper place. Further, in so far

as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;

thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we

have said concerning love and hatred.

PROP. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same

object, and the same man may be differently affected at different

times by the same object.

Proof.--The human body is affected by external bodies in a

variety of ways (II. Post. iii.). Two men may therefore be

differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.

after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by

one and the same object. Further (by the same Post.) the human

body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;

consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected

at different times by one and the same object. Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man

loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may

not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he

once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.

Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,

what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it

follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their

emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we

distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and

style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.

For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil

which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into

consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to

benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of

an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him

daring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an

evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take

into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of

an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that

he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.

[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine

intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.

Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human

judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his

emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause

pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,

are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of

things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that

a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another

with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we

can easily understand what are Repentance and Self--complacency.

Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as

cause; Self--complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of

one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because

men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).

PROP. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction

with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property

that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so

long, as an object which we conceive to have some property

peculiar to itself.

Proof.--As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in

conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.

xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the

contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another

object. And this is the case with the object, which we conceive

to have no property that is not common to many. For we thereupon

assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not

before seen in conjunction with other objects. But when we

suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we

have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while

regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to

regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the

contemplation of that object only. Therefore an object, &c.

Q.E.D.

Note.--This mental modification, or imagination of a

particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called

Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called

Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed

in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to

think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If,

however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or

anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby

regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;

otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,

the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence,

industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our

love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when

joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. We may in

like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other

emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able

to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in

ordinary speech. Whence it is evident, that the names of the

emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their

ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their

nature.

To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from

the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or

fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears

to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,

we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),

determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from

the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,

we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause

of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the

thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities

which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on

the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more

particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion

springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision

spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn

from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.

Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,

in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other

emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any

recognized name.

PROP. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of

activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in

proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and

its own power of activity.

Proof.--A man does not know himself except through the

modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and

xxiii.). When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate

itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or

(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be

greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able

to conceive itself and its own power of activity. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--This pleasure is fostered more and more, in

proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.

For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more

he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by

the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)

himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea

of himself. Q.E.D.

PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as

assert its power of activity.

Proof.--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual

essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind

obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not

that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind

endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its

power of activity. Q.E.D.

PROP. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels

pain thereat.

Proof.--The essence of the mind only affirms that which the

mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to

conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last

Prop.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own

weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting

to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is

checked in its endeavour----in other words (III. xi. note), it

feels pain. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man

conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the

same way as the corollary to III. liii.

Note.--This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,

is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the

contemplation of ourselves, is called self--love or

self--complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as

often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of

activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own

exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and

also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.

Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.

note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of

their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a

man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.

liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and

he conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. xl. note), in

proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard

them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most

pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some

quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms

of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in

general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the

contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall

short when compared with those of others. This pain (III.

xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong

construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he

can, embellishing his own.

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred

and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For

parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely

by the spur of honour and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple

to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's

virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such

doubts, I append the following corollary.

Corollary.--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his

equal.

Proof.--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.

xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby

a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is

checked. But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,

which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a

man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the

same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to

another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot

be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue

in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an

one. But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same

nature as himself. Q.E.D.

Note.--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,

we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,

&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar

to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more

envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions

for being courageous.

PROP. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of

desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as

vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,

hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we

are affected.

Proof.--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions

compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or

passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive

(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so

far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,

we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we

conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by

an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the

nature of an external body. Wherefore the nature of every

passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature

of the object whereby we are affected be expressed. Namely, the

pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the

nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the

object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these

two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the

causes whence they arise are by nature different. So again the

emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature

different from the pain arising from another object, and,

similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,

&c.

Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,

love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are

affected. Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far

as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any

given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,

according as a man is affected through external causes by this or

that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,

according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so

will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one

desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,

as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.

Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of

pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)

there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects

whereby we are affected. Q.E.D.

Note.--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last

proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,

drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of

love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a

manner varying according to the object, with which they are

concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,

&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,

venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far

as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects

wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For

temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose

to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive

states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the

last--named emotions. However, I cannot here explain the

remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as

the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.

It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the

strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have

a general definition of each emotion. It is sufficient, I

repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and

the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the

mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions. Thus,

though there is a great difference between various emotions of

love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards

children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us

to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further

the nature and origin of the emotions.

PROP. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the

emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of

the one individual differs from the essence of the other.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see

after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.). Nevertheless, we will

prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.

All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,

as their definitions above given show. But desire is each man's

nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one

individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so

far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature

or essence of the other. Again, pleasure and pain are passive

states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to

persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or

hindered (III. xi. and note). But by the endeavour to persist in

its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in

conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);

therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or

appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or

diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every

man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man

differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so

far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the

essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one

individual only differs, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals

which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of

mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's

emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human

nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of

procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire

of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of

insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the

several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content

and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his

being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is

nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and

hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of

another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the

essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing

proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy

which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a

philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have

treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is

passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to

him in so far as he is active.

PROP. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities

or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and

desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.

Proof.--When the mind conceives itself and its power of

activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind

necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or

adequate idea (II. xliii.). But the mind does conceive certain

adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.). Therefore it feels pleasure in

so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it

is active (III. i.). Again, the mind, both in so far as it has

clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,

endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such

an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);

therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we

understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active. Q.E.D.

PROP. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as

active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or

desire.

Proof.--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or

pain, as their definitions, already given, show. Now by pain we

mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked

(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels

pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is

diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions

can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but

only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)

are attributable to the mind in that condition. Q.E.D.

Note.--All actions following from emotion, which are

attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set

down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into

courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas). By

courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve

his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.

By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,

solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to

unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore,

which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to

courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to

highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind

in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c.,

are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their

primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,

which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,

to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I

have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external

causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds

we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I

have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting

emotions, not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the

same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to

repentance, scorn, shame, &c. I think everyone will agree from

what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with

another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise

therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However,

for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most

important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be

more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning

love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a

thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,

acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another

way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind

begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when

we conceive something which generally delights us with its

flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we

are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is

otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus

otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be

stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be

stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel

repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the

presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become

odious. This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or

weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward

modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for

instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these

are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the

mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be

supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,

interpolating such observations as I think should here and there

be added.

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

I. Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is

conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given

modification of itself.

Explanation.--We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of

this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;

further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is

determined to act in a way tending to promote its own

persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that,

strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite

and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or

not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to

avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from

explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it

in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those

endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms

appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said,

that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived

as determined to a particular activity; but from such a

definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can

be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to

imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,

in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.

For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every

disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be

innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of

thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,

lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.

By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,

impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each

man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to

another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and

knows not where to turn.

II. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater

perfection.

III. Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less

perfection.

Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection

itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he

passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of

pleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration of

the contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists

in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less

perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he

partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that

pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For

absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;

wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition

from a greater to a less perfection--in other words, it is an

activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or

constrained (cf. III. xi. note). I pass over the definitions of

merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these

terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely

kinds of pleasure or pain.

IV. Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein

the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in

question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and

note).

Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,

why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway

falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the

images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one

follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if

the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand

in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other

causes to think of something else.

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is

of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include

wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include

it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no

positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but

merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the

mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the

contemplation of another.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary

emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,

pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder simply because it is

customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three

primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the

objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a

definition of contempt.

V. Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind

so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those

qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.

III. lii. note).

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for

I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.

VI. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external

cause.

Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the

essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say

that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved

object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,

as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,

they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its

properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted

to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say

that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to

unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish

consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I

have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I

mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is

absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for

love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by

wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of

the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the

lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

VII. Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external

cause.

Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after what

has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.

also III. xiii. note).

VIII. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of

something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

IX. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which

is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).

X. Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.

lii.) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens

that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall

cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion

readily degenerates into simple love.

XI. Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the

presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we

hate.

Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we

deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent

rejoice (III. xx.). But since we assume that man hates that

which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not

without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).

XII. Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of

something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt

the issue.

XIII. Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of

something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt

the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).

Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that there is

no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.

For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of

anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the

existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this

extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while

dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who

fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something

which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the

existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels

pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will

turn out as he desires (III. xx.).

XIV. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something

past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

XV. Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or

future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair

from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event

has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives

something past or future as present and regards it as such, or

else because he conceives other things, which exclude the

existence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never

be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.

xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt

concerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt

concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it

(II. xlix. note). Thus it may happen that we are affected by the

same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or

future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I

have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I

refer the reader.

XVI. Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,

which has had an issue beyond our hope.

XVII. Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of

something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

XVIII. Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has

befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.

III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).

Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there

seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is

used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in

reference to a disposition.

XIX. Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.

XX. Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to

another.

Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed in

senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my

purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature

of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my

meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary

signification. One statement of my method will suffice. As for

the cause of the above--named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,

and III. xxii. note.

XXI. Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the

love we bear him.

XXII. Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we

hate him.

Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and

disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also

be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too

highly of a beloved object. Contrariwise, disparagement may be

defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too

meanly of a hated object. Cf. III. xxvi. note.

XXIII. Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be

pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's

evil fortune.

Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by

doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be

thus defined:

XXIV. Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a

man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at

another's evil fortune.

Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and

xxxii. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain

accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in

itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which

are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.

XXV. Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's

contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

XXVI. Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his

own weakness of body or mind.

Explanation--Self--complacency is opposed to humility, in so

far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of

our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby

pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe

we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed

to repentance, which we may thus define:

XXVII. Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some

action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision

of our mind.

Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in

III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note. Concerning

the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note. This is

perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is

nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly

called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are

called right, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather

from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on

education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,

and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and

also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought

it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the

latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For

custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that

which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some

consider honourable others consider disgraceful. According as

each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given

action or glories therein.

XXVIII. Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from

self--love.

Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for the

latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride

is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as

partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or

property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love

of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think

too highly of himself. To this emotion there is no contrary.

For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred;

I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he

conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For

whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he

imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,

that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot

do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long

is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it

impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such

matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable

that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,

that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should

imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the

world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again,

a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in

the present something in relation to a future time of which he is

uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable

to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do

nothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a

man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive

fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,

venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an

emotion which I will call self--abasement, for as from

self--complacency springs pride, so from humility springs

self--abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:

XXIX. Self--abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by

reason of pain.

Explanation--We are nevertheless generally accustomed to

oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention

to the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont

to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who

talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,

who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a

style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On

the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who

confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and

who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.

However, these emotions, humility and self--abasement, are

extremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives

against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence

those, who are believed to be most self--abased and humble, are

generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.

XXX. Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action

of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.

[11] Gloria.

XXXI. Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of

our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.

Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we

should here remark the difference which exists between shame and

modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are

ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains

a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed

to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will

duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have

remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to

their nature.

I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions

arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of

those which I refer to desire.

XXXII. Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,

kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same

time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude

the existence of it.

Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are by that very

fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to

contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something

present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,

is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the

existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember

something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that

very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of

pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once

checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence

of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly

speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from

the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note). But, as

the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion

down, among the emotions springing from desire.

XXXIII. Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us

by our conception that others have the same desire.

Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees others running

away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,

he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws

towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own

were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's

emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of

emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become

customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that

which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant. As to the

cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note. The reason why

this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.

xxxii. and note.

XXXIV. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing

from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar

feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. Cf. III. xxxix.

note and xl.

XXXV. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.

Cf. III. xxvii. note.

XXXVI. Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are

induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.

XXXVII. Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through

mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has

injured us. (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)

XXXVIII. Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is

impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a

passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his

anger and revenge.

XXXIX. Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we

dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. Cf. III. xxxix. note.

XL. Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do

something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

XLI. Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by

the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.

Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the

fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I

do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.

Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so

far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion

of daring.

XLII. Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of

avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.

Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species of

cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double

fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a

man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the

evil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of

removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say

wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be

constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments

him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may

avert of the two. On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and

III. lii. note. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.

note.

XLIII. Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the

desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining

from that which should displease them.

XLIV. Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.

Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions

(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;

therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so

long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time

necessarily bound by this. "The best men," says Cicero, "are

especially led by honour. Even philosophers, when they write a

book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.

XLV. Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living

sumptuously.

XLVI. Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.

XLVII. Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.

XLVIII. Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual

intercourse.

Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is

still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in

III. lvi.) have on contraries. For deference is a species of

ambition. Cf. III. xxix. note.

Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,

and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the

mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an

ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,

drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear

are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For

an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and

drink at another man's expense. An ambitious man will restrain

himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are

secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,

from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those

vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For

though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,

cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain

avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he

cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,

cease to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much

concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the

appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to

these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will

speak presently.

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I

pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the

compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because

many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is

sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general

knowledge of them. However, it is established from the

definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they

all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there

is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be

called by a variety of names in accordance with its various

relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention

to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning

the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the

emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a

confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or

any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater

or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is

determined to think of one thing rather than another.

Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul

is a confused idea. For we have shown that the mind is only

passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III.

iii.) I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its

body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than

before. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote

rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.

ii.) than the nature of an external body. But the idea which

constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the

disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its

power of action or force for existence is increased or

diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when

I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not

mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition

of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of

an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,

involves more or less of reality than before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.

xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own

body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very

essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or

less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own

body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less

reality than before.

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is

increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed

of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more

or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its

own body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of

thinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I

have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to

think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the

nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the

definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

PART IV:

Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

PREFACE

Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I

name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is

not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much

so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better

for him, to follow that which is worse. Why this is so, and what

is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part

of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well to make a

few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good

and evil.

When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has

brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,

not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks

that he knows, the intention and aim of its author. For

instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not

yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work

is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will,

on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is

carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.

But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen

before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he

plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.

Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.

But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out

types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain

types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that

which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the

thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree

less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently

been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.

This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,

which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or

imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things

natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they

hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing

without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types

before herself. Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,

which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they

have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has

fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.

Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect

or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true

knowledge of what they pronounce upon.

Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does

not work with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite

Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as

that whereby it exists. For we have shown, that by the same

necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.

xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the

reason why he acts, are one and the same. Therefore, as he does

not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the

sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is

neither origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final

is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered

as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say

that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we

mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of

household life, had a desire to build a house. Wherefore, the

being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is

nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the

efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because

men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. They

are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions

and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are

determined to any particular desire. Therefore, the common

saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and

produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses

treated of in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and

imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or

notions which we form from a comparison among one another of

individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.

vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For

we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one

genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category

of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.

Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this

category, and comparing them one with another, find that some

possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,

say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as

we attribute to them anything implying negation--as term, end,

infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because

they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call

perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or

because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope

of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity

of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from

the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily

comes to pass.

As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive

quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of

thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things

one with another. Thus one and the same thing can be at the same

time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance, music is good for

him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is

deaf, it is neither good nor bad.

Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be

retained. For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a

type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful

for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have

indicated.

In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we

certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the

type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by

"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in

approaching the said type. Again, we shall that men are more

perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more

or less nearly to the said type. For it must be specially

remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a

greater perfection, or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is

changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a

horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a

man, as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we

conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is

understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly,

by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality--in

other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and

operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to

its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,

because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration

of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence

of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;

but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will

always be able to persist in existence with the same force

wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all

things are equal.

DEFINITIONS.

I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to

us.

II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a

hindrance

to us in the attainment of any good.

(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the

end.)

III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while

regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which

necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.

IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while

regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,

whether such causes be determined for producing them.

(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between

possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need

to distinguish them accurately.)

V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in

different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as

luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are

contraries, not by nature, but by accident.

VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,

present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,

which see.

(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly

conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;

that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred

feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that

which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance

from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time

of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer

interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally

distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the

same moment of time.)

VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a

desire.

VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that

is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a

man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of

effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.

AXIOM.

There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is

not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given,

there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is

removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being

true.

Proof.--Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge

which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any

positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.

xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,

they are true (II. xxxii.). Wherefore, if the positive quality

possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is

true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be

removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no

positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c. Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is more clearly understood from II.

xvi. Coroll. ii. For imagination is an idea, which indicates

rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature

of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;

whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err. For

instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant

from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long

as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true

distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;

or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains

tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected

thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall

still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For, as we

said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near

us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the

mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the

body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling

on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine

the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its

real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the

mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition

of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or

diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at

its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an

evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the

contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will

certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;

thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,

in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,

stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present

existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.

PROP. II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of

Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

Proof.--We are said to be passive, when something arises in

us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is

(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the

laws of our nature. We are passive therefore, in so far as we

are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without

other parts. Q.E.D.

PROP. III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is

limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external

causes.

Proof.--This is evident from the axiom of this part. For,

when man is given, there is something else--say A--more powerful;

when A is given, there is something else--say B--more powerful than

A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by

the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the

power of external causes. Q.E.D.

PROP. IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of

Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,

save such as can be understood through his nature only as their

adequate cause.

Proof.--The power, whereby each particular thing, and

consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of

Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but

in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence

(III. vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained

through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power

of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.

xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible,

that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood

solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would

not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this

would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was

either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only,

inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all

changes which could spring from external causes; or of the

infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be

so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any

changes save such as tended towards his own preservation. But

the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of

which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).

Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of

undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely

through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as

we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from

the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the

necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as

affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature

as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must

be deducible. It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is

infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd. It

is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any

changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a

prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order

of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as

the nature of things demands.

PROP. V. The power and increase of every passion, and its

persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we

ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of

an external cause compared with our own.

Proof.--The essence of a passion cannot be explained through

our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),

the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we

ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in

II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external

cause compared with our own. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the

rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes

obstinately fixed to him.

Proof.--The force and increase of any passion and its

persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external

cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore

(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e. Q.E.D.

PROP. VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by

another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for

controlling emotion.

Proof.--Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is

an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less

force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the

Emotions at the end of Part III.). When, therefore, the mind is

assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected

with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or

diminished. Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives

from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which

force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.

vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification

contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.);

wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a

modification contrary to, and stronger than the former

modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the

emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and

stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy

the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be

destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger

emotion. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the

mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a

modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that

which we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can

only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and

stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition

of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body

contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we

undergo.

PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but

the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious

thereof.

Proof.--We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or

the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that

is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or

hinders, our power of activity. Thus, in so far as we perceive

that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or

evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else

but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows

from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.). But this

idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united

to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction

between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of

the body, save in conception only. Therefore the knowledge of

good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we

are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.

PROP. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with

us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive

the cause to be with us.

Proof.--Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the

mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which

indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of

the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.). An emotion is

therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition

of the body. But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so

long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence

of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or

more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the

present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with

us. Q.E.D.

Note.--When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected

by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as

if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that

this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the

thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged,

whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the

image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other

things which exclude the present existence of the future object:

I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I

purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of

my work.

Corollary.--The image of something past or future, that is, of

a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time

future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other

conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;

consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is

less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt

towards something present.

PROP. X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close at

hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that

its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer

interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have

not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we

conceive that it has long passed away.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or

not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the

presence of the object less, than if its period of future

existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long

passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)

we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it

follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a

longer period than we can define in conception, though their

dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they

all affect us equally faintly.

PROP. XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary

is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion

towards that which possible, or contingent, or non--necessary.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,

to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny

a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be

necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion

towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,

more intense than an emotion that which is non--necessary. Q.E.D.

PROP. XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to

exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is

more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion

towards a thing contingent.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are

affected by the conception of some further thing, which would

assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the

other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which

exclude its present existence. But, in so far as we conceive a

thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things

which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),

things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards

something possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to

exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far

fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.

Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,

is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as

future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the

future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.

x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of

existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far

fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,

nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as

contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard

as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the

thing to be present with us. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know

not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,

fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are

not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the

existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other

hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its

present existence. But, in so far as we conceive it in relation

to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls

the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and

note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.

xvii. Coroll.). Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing

contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is

fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a

thing past. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any

emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is

considered as an emotion.

Proof.--An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its

body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the

general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no

positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what

is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by

virtue of being true, restrain any emotion. But, in so far as

such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength

for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to

restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can

be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from

the emotions whereby we are assailed.

Proof.--From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as

it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the

Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the

strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.). But,

inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of

our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also

present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must

therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.);

consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined

solely by human power. Again, the desires arising from the

emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as

the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and

increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,

which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it

(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be

more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge

of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,

in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more

easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is

agreeable at the present moment.

Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,

is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.

Coroll.). But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of

good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good

at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong

desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal

application). Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when

concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or

quenched, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and

evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is

contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire

for things that are present.

Proof.--This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.

from IV. xii. Coroll.

Note.--I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved

by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the

true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,

and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things

gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]----

"The better path I gaze at and approve,

The worse--I follow."

[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."

Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,

when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." I

have not written the above with the object of drawing the

conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or

that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his

emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the

infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can

do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I

have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human

infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled

to treat separately.

PROP. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions

being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.

Proof.--Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,

i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist

in his own being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by

the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the

contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being

felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising

from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the

power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must

be defined by human power only. Thus the former is the stronger

of the two. Q.E.D.

Note.--In these few remarks I have explained the causes of

human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide

by the precepts of reason. It now remains for me to show what

course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are

in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are

contrary thereto. But, before I begin to prove my Propositions

in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them

briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my

meaning.

As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,

that every man should love himself, should seek that which is

useful to him--I mean, that which is really useful to him, should

desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,

and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to

preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, as that a

whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III. iv.)

Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance

with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one

endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with

the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the

foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own

being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving

his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its

own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful

to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and

lastly, that suicides are weak--minded, and are overcome by

external causes repugnant to their nature. Further, it follows

from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing

without all external things for the preservation of our being or

living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside

ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our

intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could

understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things

outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to

be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than

those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for

example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,

they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them

singly.

Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than

man--nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being

can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points

agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,

one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with

one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their

being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.

Hence, men who are governed by reason--that is, who seek what is

useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves

nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,

and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their

conduct.

Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus

briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater

detail. I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain

the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every

man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation

of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.

Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the

case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I

have hitherto proceeded.

PROP. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily

desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.

Proof.--The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the

emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious

thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks

good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is

nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of

Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).

Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires

the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek

what is useful to him--in other words, to preserve his own

being--the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in

proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that

is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.

Proof.--Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by

man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely

by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.

Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his

own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently

(III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his

own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D.

Note.--No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or

preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes

external and foreign to his nature. No one, I say, from the

necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion

from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which

latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for instance,

kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists

round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a

sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;

or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's

command, to open his own veins--that is, to escape a greater evil

by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may

so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may

assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea

cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the

necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become

non--existent, is as impossible as that something should be made

out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little

reflection.

PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and

to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and

to live--in other words, to actually exist.

Proof.--The proof of this proposition, or rather the

proposition itself, is self--evident, and is also plain from the

definition of desire. For the desire of living, acting, &c.,

blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence

of man--that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to

preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can desire, &c.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this

endeavour to preserve one's own being.

Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is the essence of a

thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived

as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be

conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.

Therefore no virtue, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--The effort for self--preservation is the first and

only foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing

can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.

PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular

action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said

to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in

so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.

Proof.--In so far as a man is determined to an action through

having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.

Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived

solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which

does not follow from his virtue. But, in so far as he is

determined for an action because he understands, he is active;

that is, he does something, which is perceived through his

essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us

the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being

(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with

the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to

one's self.

Proof.--To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing

else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But

we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore

to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,

to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and

that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.

Coroll.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of

anything else.

Proof.--The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to

persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the

thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the

essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that

everyone endeavours to preserve his being. Moreover, this

proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should

endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,

the last--named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,

which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one,

&c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is

nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so

far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,

save such things as are conducive to understanding.

Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is nothing else but

the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so

far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for

continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as

necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of

Appetite, III. ix. note). But the essence of reason is nought

else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly

understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore

(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is

nothing else but to understand. Again, since this effort of the

mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to

preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this

effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and

single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand

things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the

other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able

to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are

conducive to understanding.

PROP. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save

such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are

able to hinder us from understanding.

Proof.--The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing

beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,

save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing

Prop.). But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess

certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has

adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in

so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing to be good or

evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,

and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.

Proof.--The mind is not capable of understanding anything

higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely

infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be

conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest

utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God. Again,

the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to

the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The

mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we

have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is

God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand

or to know God. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different

from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and

absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has

something in common with our nature.

Proof.--The power of every individual thing, and consequently

the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be

determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.

vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through

which human nature is conceived. Therefore our power of

activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and

consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other

individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not

by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely

different from our own; and since we call good or evil that

which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.

xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our

power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different

from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality

which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in

so far as it is contrary to our nature.

Proof.--We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.

viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when

it diminishes or checks our power of action. Therefore, if

anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in

common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or

check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.

iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that

quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,

in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),

in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is

contrary to our nature.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,

it is necessarily good.

Proof.--In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it

cannot be bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either

good or indifferent. If it be assumed that it be neither good

nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which

tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the

hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;

but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing

is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing

is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for

us, and vice versâ, in proportion as a thing is more useful for

us, so is it more in harmony with our nature. For, in so far as

it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be

different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different, it can

neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be

contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,

contrary to what is good--in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can

be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;

and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony

with our nature, and vice versâ. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they

cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.

Proof.--Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are

understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or

negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);

wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,

cannot be said to be naturally in harmony. Q.E.D.

Note.--This is also self--evident; for, if we say that white

and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we

absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect. So, if

we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both

are finite--wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of

their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power

of external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and a

stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree

only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really

agree in no respect.

PROP. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are

assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;

and to this extent one and the same man is variable and

inconstant.

Proof.--The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained

 solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i., ii.), but

it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the

nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it

follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there

are external objects whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and

that men may be differently affected by one and the same

object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,

that one and the same man may be differently affected towards

the same object, and may therefore be variable and

inconstant. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are

passions, they can be contrary one to another.

Proof.--A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's

feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to

that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole

possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and

note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in

III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate

Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen

also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should

endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.

xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another. But the

emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);

hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are

passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.

Note.--I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives

that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from

this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,

through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through

agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;

if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be

untrue. But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we

shall see that the discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not

in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,

that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one

differing from the other. For, in so far as each loves the same

thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is

(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered

thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are

at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the

agreement in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies,

as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to

differ. For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved

object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of

the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be affected

with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus

they will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in

like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on

differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.

PROP. XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,

do they always necessarily agree in nature.

Proof.--In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are

passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at

variance one with another. But men are only said to be active,

in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);

therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it

is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely

through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every

man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,

and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and

further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem

good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows

that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,

necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human

nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.

Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with

each man's nature. Therefore, men in so far as they live in

obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with

another. Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--There is no individual thing in nature, which is

more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.

For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony

with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.

But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when

he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this

extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of

another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual

things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in

obedience to reason. Q.E.D.

Corollary II.--As every man seeks most that which is useful to

him, so are men most useful one to another. For the more a man

seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,

the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the

same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to

act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in

obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when

they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore

(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to

another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.

Q.E.D.

Note.--What we have just shown is attested by experience so

conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man

is to man a God." Yet it rarely happens that men live in

obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that

they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.

Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so

that the definition of man as a social animal has met with

general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much

more convenience than injury. Let satirists then laugh their

fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes

praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them

heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,

they will find that men can provide for their wants much more

easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can

they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not

to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,

to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts. But I

will treat of this more at length elsewhere.

PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is

common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

Proof.--To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason

(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to

reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the

highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;

that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and

can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of

the same nature. Q.E.D.

Note.--Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of

those who follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it

not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in

obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they

agree in nature, would be at variance one with another? To such

an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but

from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is

common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of

man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could

neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure

in this highest good. For it belongs to the essence of the human

mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal

and infinite essence of God.

PROP. XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after

virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,

and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge

of God.

Proof.--Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,

are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);

therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily

endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to

reason. But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided

by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for

himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which

each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also

for others. Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the

mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);

now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),

which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it

(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in

proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of

God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of

virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good

for himself. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.--The good, which a man desires for himself and

loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love

it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others

should love it also; and as the good in question is common to

all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,

for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice

therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in

proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

Note I.--He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause

others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the

world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,

and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight

in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar

impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what

pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought by men

under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be

possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love

it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they

delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed. But he, who

endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but

courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.

Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in

so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to

Religion. The desire of well--doing, which is engendered by a

life according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire,

whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate

others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by

honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according

to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the

gaining of friendship. I have also shown in addition what are

the foundations of a state; and the difference between true

virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have

said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in

accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but

man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to

himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded

by the general disposition of things rather than by his own

nature considered solely in itself.

[13] Honestas

Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.

of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the

slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition

and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of

what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of

associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,

or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the

same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.

Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men

have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.

Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we

may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,

treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature

is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from

human emotions (III. lvii. note). It remains for me to explain

what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit. On these points

see the following note.

Note II.--In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain

praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:

the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I

must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature

and in society.

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,

consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions

which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by

sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is

bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own

disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to

him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which

he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.). Now,

if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain

in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to

his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.). But seeing that they are a

prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue

(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and

being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in

need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note). Wherefore, in order that

men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is

necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for

the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure

their fellow--men. The way in which this end can be obtained, so

that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.

Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each

other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.

vii. and III. xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only

be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to

itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of

incurring a greater injury themselves.

On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps

in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging

injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also

possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to

pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in

restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note). Such a

society established with laws and the power of preserving itself

is called a State, while those who live under its protection are

called citizens. We may readily understand that there is in the

state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced

good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely

of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with

reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good

or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it

can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on

by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State

authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is

therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on

the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is

thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages

which a State provides.

Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent

master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be

said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are

common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no

wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that

which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the

state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas

are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common

consent what belongs to one man and what to another.

From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and

injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes

which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.

PROP. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to

render it capable of being affected in an increased number of

ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of

ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is

thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting

other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,

whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is

hurtful to man.

Proof.--Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body

increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.);

therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it

capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and

is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body

capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is

hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the

proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body

mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a

change in such proportion is bad.

Proof.--The human body needs many other bodies for its

preservation (II. Post. iv.). But that which constitutes the

specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts

communicate their several motions one to another in a certain

fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).

Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the

proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human

body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the

human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of

being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in

many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.). Again,

whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion

causes the human body to assume another specific character, in

other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the

point is indeed self--evident), to be destroyed, and consequently

totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of

ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.

Note.--The extent to which such causes can injure or be of

service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I

would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,

when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually

among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny

that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and

other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to

consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally

different from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to

maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;

nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.

It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I

should hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a

certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and

though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his

past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he

had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for

a grown--up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If

this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A

man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can

only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy

of other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions

undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for

raising new issues.

PROP. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes

men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever

brings discord into a State is bad.

Proof.--For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony

also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is

therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)

whatsoever brings about discord is bad. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:

contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.

Proof.--Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the

body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is

emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or

checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,

&c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;

contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.

Proof.--Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,

which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all

parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),

the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a

manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion

of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),

and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in the

same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is

referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or

hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV.

xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other

hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is

bad.

Proof.--Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is

pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,

consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the

rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this

emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body

(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus

rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other

ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief,

which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.). But, as its

force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause

compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees

and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,

therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and

preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's

capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.

Proof.--Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an

external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,

accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.

note); hence love maybe excessive. Again, the strength of

desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises

(III. xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's

actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from

the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become

excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning

stimulation.

Note.--Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived

more easily than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby

we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the

body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions

are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation

of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and

although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions--and very few

are found who are always assailed by one and the same--yet there

are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately

fixed. We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,

although it be not present, they think they have it before them;

when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is

delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with

love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their

mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are

made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but

gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but

glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are

generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated. But,

in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,

though they may not be reckoned among diseases.

PROP. XLV. Hatred can never be good.

Proof.--When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.

xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that

is bad. Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.

N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred

towards men.

Corollary I.--Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and

other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are

bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.

Corollary II.--Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is

base, and in a State unjust. This also is evident from III.

xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.

xxxvii. note.

Note.--Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to

be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference. For

laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so

long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).

Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and

gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate one's

hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,

and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,

save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,

nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,

which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the

greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the

perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we

necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use

of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible

(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is

the part of a wise man. I say it is the part of a wise man to

refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and

drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing

plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,

and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to

his neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous

parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of

fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be

equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from

the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the

mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things

simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees best with our

principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there

be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is

the best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for

me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.

PROP. XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason,

endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,

for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.

Proof.--All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);

therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will

endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such

emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to

prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.). But hatred is

increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love

(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);

therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will

endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.

Q.E.D.

Note.--He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is

assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with

love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands

many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.

Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but

through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow

so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,

that I have no need to prove them in detail.

PROP. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves

good.

Proof.--Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.

For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of

the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without

fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in

themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive

pleasure (IV. xliii.). Q.E.D.

Note.--We may add, that these emotions show defective

knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same

reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of

a want of mental power. For although confidence and joy are

pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,

namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to be

guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to

free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate

fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.

PROP. XLVIII. The emotions of over--esteem and disparagement are

always bad.

Proof.--These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)

are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)

bad. Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIX. Over--esteem is apt to render its object proud.

Proof.--If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's

sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be

pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good

which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and

therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other

words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.

PROP. L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,

is in itself bad and useless.

Proof.--Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and

therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which

follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity

from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the

dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of

reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for

certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under

the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.

Q.E.D.

Note.--He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from

the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in

accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not

find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will

he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human

virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to

rejoice. We may add, that he, who is easily touched with

compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does

something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can

never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly

because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this

place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of

reason. He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by

compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems

unlike a man.

PROP. LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree

therewith and arise therefrom.

Proof.--Approval is love towards one who has done good to

another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be

referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.

lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;

therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.

Another Proof.--He, who lives under the guidance of reason,

desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.

xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow

his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will

feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the

benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.

Note.--Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,

xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark

that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace

punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said

to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by

hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.

PROP. LII. Self--approval may arise from reason, and that which

arises from reason is the highest possible.

Proof.--Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's

contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the

Emotions, xxv.). But a man's true power of action or virtue is

reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and

distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore

self--approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is

contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly

or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action

(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of

understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the

highest possible self--approval arise. Q.E.D.

Note.--Self--approval is in reality the highest object for

which we can hope. For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one

endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior

object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and

strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary

(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame

becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life

under disgrace is almost unendurable.

PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from

reason.

Proof.--Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of

his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.). But, in so

far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to

understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).

Wherefore, if a man in self--contemplation perceives any infirmity

in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but

(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.

But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by

virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the

knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this

is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands

himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity

is aided. Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a

man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the

contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.

Q.E.D.

[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I

have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to

'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).

PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from

reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or

infirm.

Proof.--The first part of this proposition is proved like the

foregoing one. The second part is proved from the mere

definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,

xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by

evil desires; secondly, by pain.

Note.--As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these

two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and

Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had

better sin in that direction. For, if all men who are a prey to

emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,

and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked

together in bonds of union? The crowd plays the tyrant, when it

is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who

consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously

commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who

are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than

others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become

free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

PROP. LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance

of self.

Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and

xxix.

PROP. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme

infirmity of spirit.

Proof.--The first foundation of virtue is self--preservation

(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).

He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the

foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.

Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of

reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of

reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).

Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and

consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;

in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus

extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and

the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

Note.--Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;

for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a

painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful

(IV. xviii.).

PROP. LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers

and parasites, but hates the company of the high--minded.

Proof.--Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation

of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this

estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the

means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight

in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is

too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the

company of high--minded men, who value him according to his

deserts. Q.E.D.

Note.--It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the

evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all

the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.

I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may

be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,

therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising

from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself

superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite

quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising

from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior

to his fellows. Such being the ease, we can easily see that a

proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes

pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his

bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.

Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the

dejected man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as

his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and

other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other

words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in

contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb,

"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow--sufferers."

Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he

thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to

envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's

actions, with a view to fault--finding rather than correction, in

order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory

therein, though all the time with a dejected air. These effects

follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from

the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two

right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar

emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The

laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man

is but a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think

that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds

of men rather than the nature and properties of things. For, as

I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions

and their properties as on the same footing with other natural

phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and

ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as

other things which we admire, and which we delight to

contemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in the

emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon

him.

PROP. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may

arise therefrom.

Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and

also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.

i.).

Note--Empty honour, as it is styled, is self--approval,

fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this

good opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval, in other

words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);

consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,

day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain

his reputation. For the populace is variable and inconstant, so

that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.

Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and

readily represses the fame of others. The object of the strife

being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is

seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every

possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more

proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to

himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being

nothing.

The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred

from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I

will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,

is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is

really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same

way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not

mortified. Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,

he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no

desire to live honourably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon

concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the

desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good

or evil emotions. But all, in so far as they are engendered in

us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is

evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be

useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance

of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.

PROP. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by

emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined

without emotion by reason.

Proof.--To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.

ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the

necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone. But pain is

bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action

(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any

action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance

of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a

man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this

extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we

could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly,

pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for

it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is

increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in

so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent

of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his

actions (III. iii., and note).

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to

such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception

of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,

capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion

wherein the mind is passive. But all emotions are attributable

to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.

explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing

else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.

Q.E.D.

Another Proof.--A given action is called bad, in so far as it

arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.

But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad

(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same

action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the

action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,

we may be led by reason (IV. xix.). Q.E.D.

Note.--An example will put this point in a clearer light. The

action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and

in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his

arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently

downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper

to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, moved by

anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,

this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one

and the same action can be associated with various mental images

of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of

one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and

distinct ideas. Hence it is evident that every desire which

springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become

useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us now see why

desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is

called by us blind.

PROP. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not

attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts

thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.

Proof.--Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a

body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails

over the remaining parts (IV. vi.). This part will not endeavour

to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of

the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary

for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own

powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd. The said part, and,

consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its

condition. Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind

aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it

be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so

that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same

manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to

a man as a whole. Q.E.D.

Note.--As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to

one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being

with out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to

which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over

us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.

PROP. LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

Proof.--Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered

absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is

conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by

some given modification of itself. Hence desire, which arises

from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so

far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far

as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are

adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.).

Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered

in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able

to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction. Therefore,

such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the

dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be

of a thing future, past, or present.

Proof.--Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of

reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.

xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same

certitude (II. xliii. and note). Wherefore, whether the thing be

present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same

necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether

the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all

cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always

possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);

therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the

dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether

the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. Q.E.D.

Note.--If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the

duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods

of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same

emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though

it were present the good which it conceived as future;

consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the

present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would

in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source

of evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we

can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of

things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.

xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not

so powerfully affected by the future as by the present. Hence

such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely

abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order

of things and the connection of causes, with a view to

determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather

imaginary than real. Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the

desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as

it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the

desire of things which are agreeable at the present time. (Cf.

IV. xvi.)

PROP. LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to

escape evil, is not led by reason.

Proof.--All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as

active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and

desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does

good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Note.--Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at

vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by

reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape

evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as

wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if

they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow--men.

Corollary.--Under desire which springs from reason, we seek

good directly, and shun evil indirectly.

Proof.--Desire which springs from reason can only spring from

a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.

lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive

(IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs

from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under

the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by

implication shun evil. Q.E.D.

Note.--This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a

sick and a healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats

what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes

pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of

life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to

avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from

hatred or anger but from love of the public well--being, is guided

solely by reason.

PROP. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Proof.--The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far

as we are conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a

lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore

cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.);

therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)

depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof

(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed

only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.

PROP. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the

greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Proof.--A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good

is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to

things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see

preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser

good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only

the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the

lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun

the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.

For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,

and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the

former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater

good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,

and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a

greater evil in the future.[15]

[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).

Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi

alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious

misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris

boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)

Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things

future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same

way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking

merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,

there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be

assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we

may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser

good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a

lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater

good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,

because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future. This

Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the

Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.

Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have

pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part

up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a

man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is

led by reason. The former, whether will or no, performs actions

whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and

only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance

in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the

former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose

disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few

observations.

PROP. LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things;

and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.--A free man is one who lives under the guidance of

reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly

desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words

(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his

being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore

such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom

is a meditation of life. Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they

remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.--I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,

therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only

adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no

conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being

correlative) of good. Q.E.D.

Note.--It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of

this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as

we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so

far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the

cause of man's existence.

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to

have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.

For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save

that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he

provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God

forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of

good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,

he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.

Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in

entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be

nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that

after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway

began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his

freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the

patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of

God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire

for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have

shown above (IV. xxxvii.).

PROP. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,

when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

Proof.--Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion

contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining

emotion (IV. vii.). But blind daring and fear are emotions,

which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):

hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring

than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of

the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,

when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.--The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as

in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of

mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.

Note.--What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,

I explained in III. lix. note. By danger I mean everything,

which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,

&c.

PROP. LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,

as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.

Proof.--Everyone judges what is good according to his

disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who

has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon

it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the

receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.). But the free man only

desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not

repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,

but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,

and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary

importance. Therefore the free man, lest he should become

hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than

reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving

their favours.

Note.--I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant,

yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human

aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often

necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay

such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in

declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of

despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious

motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for

offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in

declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility

and courtesy.

PROP. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to

another.

Proof.--Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,

and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of

friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,

with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.

xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one

to another. Q.E.D.

Note.--The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire

have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,

rather than pure goodwill. Moreover, ingratitude is not an

emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a

man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.

He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,

is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the

gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal

his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one

shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be

corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.

PROP. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in

good faith.

Proof.--If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a

case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the

danger of present death? Would not his plan of self--preservation

completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by

pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would

persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason

would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their

forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any

general laws, which is absurd.

PROP. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in

a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in

solitude, where he is independent.

Proof.--The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey

through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to

preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is

(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,

he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.

xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.

ii.), to live according to the laws of his country. Therefore

the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to

possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.

Note.--These and similar observations, which we have made on

man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to

courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note). I do not

think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of

strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no

man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no

man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. These

propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and

religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;

namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every

man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.

We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.

l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever

first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity

of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful

and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,

horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his

own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.

Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they

really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such

as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar

emotions, which I have mentioned above. Thus he endeavours, as

we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on

his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of attaining

to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in

the following Part.

APPENDIX.

What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life

has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,

but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought each

Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.

I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them

under leading heads.

I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the

necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either

through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our

being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived

through itself without other individuals.

II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,

that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are

referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to

consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only

referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things

inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined

not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to

us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter

passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,

on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined

by man's power or reason, are always good. The rest may be

either good or bad.

IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect

the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone

man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed

blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which

arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the

understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's

attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of

his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the

ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all

his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate

conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his

intelligence.

V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational

life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his

enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by

intelligence. Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's

perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational

life, are alone called evil.

VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are

necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external

causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal

nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to

conform to in almost infinite ways.

VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of

nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if

he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with

his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,

whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in

harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate

himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be

capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the

rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems

safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good

or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the

rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we

think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right

of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any

given thing than other individuals of the same species;

therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and

the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful

than his fellow--man who is led by reason. Further, as we know

not anything among individual things which is more excellent than

a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his

skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at

last to live under the dominion of their own reason.

X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of

hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are

therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful

than their fellows.

XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and

high--mindedness.

XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate

their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds

as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and

generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.

XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.

For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the

guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and

more prone to revenge than to sympathy. No small force of

character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to

restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But

those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at

vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than

strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and

others. Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from

misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes

rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably

endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and

choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in

preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their

father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as

they may spite their parents.

XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in

everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common

brings many more advantages than drawbacks. Wherefore it is

better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive

to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and

friendship.

XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are

attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living. For men

brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is

reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received

customs of their society. For winning love those qualities are

especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.

IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).

XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such

harmony is insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of

spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the

same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a

certain resemblance to piety.

XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially

such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain

life. However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the

power and the advantage of any private person. For the riches of

any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.

Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited

for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence providing

for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and

has regard only to the general advantage.

XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our

duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).

XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of

generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort

of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,

readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a

species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than

harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).

XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in

harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not

engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to

beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the

love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused

by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.

XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by

means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery. None are

more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be

first, but are not.

XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety

and religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet

is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.

note).

XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such

matters as cannot be hid. Further, as shame is a species of

pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.

XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are

directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;

and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance

to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass

judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's

rights.

XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire

of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to

piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.). But, if it spring

from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under

the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and

seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word

or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,

I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:

not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called

after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his

conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and

will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but

he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way

whereby it may be perfected. Thus will men be stirred not by

fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to

endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to

reason.

XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature

in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with

ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,

whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our

advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or

destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to

our use as best we may.

XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to

us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from

observing them, and from recombining their elements in different

forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this

point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and

nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their

functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable of being

affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external

bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind

capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.). But there seem to be

very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due

nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.

For the human body is composed of very many parts of different

nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so

that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything

that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the

mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.

XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of

each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one

another mutual aid. But money has furnished us with a token for

everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind

of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly

conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the

idea of money as cause.

XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek

money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but

because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring

themselves to great splendour. Certainly they nourish their

bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they

lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of

their body. But they who know the true use of money, and who fix

the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,

live content with little.

XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the

various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their

functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid

to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;

it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.

But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us

pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit

our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred

to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore

most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at

hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become

excessive. Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most

regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate

what is future with emotions equally vivid. (IV. xliv. note, and

lx. note.)

XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as

good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.

However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious

take delight in my infirmity and trouble. For the greater the

pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection

whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the

divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated

by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is

led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by

reason.

XXXII. But human power is extremely limited, and is

infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have

not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those

things which are without us. Nevertheless, we shall bear with an

equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims

of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have

done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not

sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;

remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we

follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding

of this, that part of our nature which is defined by

intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will

assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence

will endeavour to persist. For, in so far as we are intelligent

beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,

nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which

is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding

of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is

in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.

PART V:

Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

PREFACE

At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which

is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore

treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the

reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental

Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much

more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part

of my design to point out the method and means whereby the

understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the

body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of

its functions. The latter question lies in the province of

Medicine, the former in the province of Logic. Here, therefore,

I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of

reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its

dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.

That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have

already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions

depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely

govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the

protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,

that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and

moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the

example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house--dog

and the other a hunting--dog. For by long training it could be

brought about, that the house--dog should become accustomed to

hunt, and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares. To

this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained,

that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of

the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the

aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which

are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which

the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various

ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst

of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of

the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the

midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal

spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different

marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different

external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;

whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the

gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once

before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the

gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and

determining them to the condition wherein they were, when

repulsed before by a similar position of the gland. He further

asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature

to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever

anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition

causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in

question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the

mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,

inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the

animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would

dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with

the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to

look at remote or very near objects. Lastly, he maintained that,

although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been

united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole

number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet

it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with

other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de

l'âme, I.50. He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,

that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power

over its passions. For passions as defined by him are

"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are

referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)

are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement

of the spirits." (Passions de l'âme, I.27). But, seeing that we

can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,

to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely

on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with

sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our

actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which

we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an

absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of

this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his

own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could

hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I

am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,

that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from

self--evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not

clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to

task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through

occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which

occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I

ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and

distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union

with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like

him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he

had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,

that he could not assign any particular cause of the union

between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have

recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.

Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the

mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it

hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can

be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the

animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we

have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again

disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would

follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given

danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,

yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended

in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything

except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of

volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between

the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;

consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined

by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no

gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it

can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that

all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the

brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes

concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have

abundantly proved that his premisses are false. Therefore, since

the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the

understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of

the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all

have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or

distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those

conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.

AXIOMS.

I. If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a

change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of

the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.

II. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,

in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence

of its cause.

(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged

and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or

the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and

associated in the body.

Proof.--The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.

vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the

order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and

vii.) as the order and connection of ideas. Wherefore, even as

the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place

according to the order and association of modifications of the

body (II. xviii.), so vice versâ (III. ii.) the order and

connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance

with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are

arranged and associated in the mind. Q.E.D.

PROP. II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,

from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other

thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external

cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these

emotions, be destroyed.

Proof.--That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,

is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause

(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is

removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;

therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are

destroyed. Q.E.D.

PROP. III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a

passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

Proof.--An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by

the general Def. of the Emotions). If, therefore, we form a

clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only

be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to

the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.

iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion. Q.E.D.

Corollary--An emotion therefore becomes more under our

control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in

proportion as it is more known to us.

PROP. IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we

cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be

conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and

Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,

whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof

we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an

emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general

Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding

Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.

Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by

an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly

understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate

(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and

distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not

absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it

about, that he should become less subject to them. To attain

this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to

acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of

every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,

be determined to think of those things which it clearly and

distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus

that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an

external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence

it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be

destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which

are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of

being excessive (IV. lxi.). For it must be especially remarked,

that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and

that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.

For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,

that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own

fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by

reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and

does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives

by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is

called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof). In like

manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as

they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are

accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by

adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to

any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from

inadequate ideas (IV. lix.). Than this remedy for the emotions

(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in

a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within

our power, can be devised. For the mind has no other power save

that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown

above (III. iii.).

PROP. V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,

and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other

conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.

Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be

free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be

necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one

towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).

But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to

conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes

whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);

therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply

is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel

towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,

consequently, it is the greatest of all. Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is

less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as

necessary.

Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.

xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an

infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing

Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less

subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)

feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.

Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is

applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly

and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the

emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see, that the

pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as

the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means

have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an

infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,

because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.

Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one here

and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because

infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and

necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may

note several other instances of the same sort.

PROP. VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if

we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are

attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the

emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,

being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the

said thing (II. xvii.). Wherefore, the emotion, which is

referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a

nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.

vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort

controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its

external cause (IV. ix.). But an emotion which springs from

reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things

(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always

regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their

present existence), and which we always conceive in the same

manner (II. xxxviii.). Wherefore an emotion of this kind always

remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which

are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external

causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,

until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the

emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Q.E.D.

PROP. VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number

of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few

(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased

number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion

becomes stronger. Q.E.D.

Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.

PROP. IX. An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse

causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion

itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less

affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different

and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a

single cause.

Proof.--An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it

hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);

therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the

contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than

another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in

the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is

unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.

Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.

vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less

passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of

several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong

emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few

or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this

emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to

several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.

Q.E.D.

PROP. X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to

our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the

modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that

is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede

the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.). So long, therefore, as

we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the

mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.

xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear

and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.

note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such

cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of

the body according to the intellectual order. Q.E.D.

Note.--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the

bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily

affected by evil emotions. For (V. vii.) a greater force is

needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and

associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,

are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so

long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is

to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,

to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the

particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so

that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that

it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid

down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred

should be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not required

with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be

always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think

over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and

in what manner and way they may be best warded off by

high--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with

the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready

for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.). If we keep also

in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good

which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;

further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result

of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than

everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such

case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises

therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and

will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a

grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be

overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner

than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As

is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii. We should, in the same

way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the

ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and

imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of

resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.

But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions

we should always bear in mind that which is good in every

individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order

that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of

pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the

pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for

which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain

it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the

fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except

through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do

the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of

gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving

vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is

certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of

honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily

covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common

to all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.

For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the

misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely

torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not

only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So,

again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love

think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock

faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,

directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.

Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the

love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of

the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy

which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise

desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to

revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently

observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not

difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for

the most part, to direct his actions according to the

commandments of reason.

[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground

that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.

PROP. XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more

objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and

occupies the mind more.

Proof.--In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is

referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can

be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind

contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;

therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in

full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more. Q.E.D.

PROP. XII. The mental images of things are more easily

associated with the images referred to things which we clearly

and distinctly understand, than with others.

Proof.--Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,

are either the common properties of things or deductions

therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are

consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.

Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate

other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with

something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of

the said things should be more often associated with the images

of these than with the images of something else. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as

it is associated with a greater number of other images.

Proof.--In proportion as an image is associated with a greater

number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes

whereby it can be aroused. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily

modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of

God.

Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind

may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);

wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred

to the idea of God (I. xv.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and

his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he

more understands himself and his emotions.

Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and

his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is

(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore

(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the

same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more

understands himself and his emotions. Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in

the mind.

Proof.--For this love is associated with all the modifications

of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);

therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.

Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by

any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.--All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are

true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and

therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without

passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a

lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of

the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of

pleasure or pain.

Corollary.--Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate

anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any

emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,

vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.

Proof.--The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect

(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,

we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be

no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of

the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand God as the

cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause

of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the

causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a

passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,

in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to

that extent feel pleasure.

PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should

love him in return.

Proof.--For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.

xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and

consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is

absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion

of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in

proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to

God by the same bond of love.

Proof.--This love towards God is the highest good which we can

seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common

to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice

therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),

it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of

jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);

but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in

proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice

therein. Q.E.D.

Note.--We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion

directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be

destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God

is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as

it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the

body be destroyed also. As to its nature, in so far as it is

referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.

I have now gone through all the remedies against the

emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can

do against them. Whence it appears that the mind's power over

the emotions consists:----

I. In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the

thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.

ii. and V. iv. note).

III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions

referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those

referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner

(V. vii.).

IV. In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]

are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of

things or to God (V. ix. xi.).

[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus----emotions.

V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and

associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and

xii. xiii. xiv.).

But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions

may be better understood, it should be specially observed that

the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion

of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is

more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are

comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,

and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than

by another. For the strength of every emotion is defined by a

comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.

Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its

infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge

only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,

whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it

may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by

its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,

whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,

although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former

mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas

attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human

infirmity. Again, it must be observed, that spiritual

unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to

excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,

and which we can never become masters of. For no one is

solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;

neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in

regard to things whereof no one can be really master.

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and

distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge

(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,

possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy

them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at

any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind

(V. xiv.). Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable

and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession

(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which

are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to

strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and

deeply penetrate it.

And now I have finished with all that concerns this present

life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have

briefly described all the remedies against the emotions. And

this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has

attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the

definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to

Propositions i. and iii. of Part III. It is now, therefore, time

to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of

the mind, without relation to the body.

PROP. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what

is past, while the body endures.

Proof.--The mind does not express the actual existence of its

body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as

actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,

consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine

any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.

Thus it

cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.

xvii. note),

or remember things past, except while the body endures (see

definition of Memory, II. xviii. note). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,

which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the

form of eternity.

Proof.--God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or

that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.). This

essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the

very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a

certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must

necessarily exist in God (II. iii.). Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with

the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Proof.--There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which

expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,

therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence

of the human mind (II. xiii.). But we have not assigned to the

human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as

it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained

through duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. viii.

Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body

endures. Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is

conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence

of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the

essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body

under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode

of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is

necessarily eternal. Yet it is not possible that we should

remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear

no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in

terms of time, or have any relation to time. But,

notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal. For the

mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no

less than those things that it remembers. For the eyes of the

mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than

proofs. Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before

the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the

essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and

that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or

explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to

endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in

so far as it involves the actual existence of the body. Thus far

only has it the power of determining the existence of things by

time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.

PROP. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more

do we understand God.

Proof.--This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.

PROP. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest

virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate

idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the

essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,

in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better

understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the

highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or

nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to

understand things by the third kind of knowledge. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of

understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires

more to understand things by that kind.

Proof--This is evident. For, in so far as we conceive the

mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of

knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to

conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),

the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable

thereof. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the

highest possible mental acquiescence.

Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.

xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge

(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind

knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):

consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge

passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.

of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such

pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own

virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of

knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the

third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the

second kind of knowledge.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident. For whatsoever we

understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through

itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that

is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are

referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)

cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and

are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from

adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of

knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of

knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from

the first, but from the second kind. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of

eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the

present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving

the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence

of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be

determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of

conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But

eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.

and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the

power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it

possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to

conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.

ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to

conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.

xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to

the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of

conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the

mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body

under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.

Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as

existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in

God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.

Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we

conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the

eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and

note, which see.

PROP. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body

under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a

knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived

through God.

Proof.--Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this

involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.). Therefore to

conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things

in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as

real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the

essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives

itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that

extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as

its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.--The mind does not conceive anything under the form of

eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the

form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is

eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so

far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which

knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,

in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything

which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in

other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge

(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind

(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or

formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.

Note.--In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in

this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of

himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and

blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must

here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind

is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of

eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more

readily explained and better understood, we will consider the

mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to

understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have

done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so

long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our

premisses are plain.

PROP. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of

knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by

the idea of God as cause.

Proof.--From this kind of knowledge arises the highest

possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,

xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea

of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the

idea also of God as cause. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--From the third kind of knowledge necessarily

arises the intellectual love of God. From this kind of knowledge

arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is

(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as

we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we

understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the

intellectual love of God.

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from

the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Proof.--The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.

Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises

therefrom is also necessarily eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.--Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing

Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of

love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.

of the last Prop. Nor is there here any difference, except that

the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we

feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of

God as eternal cause. If pleasure consists in the transition to

a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the

mind being endowed with perfection itself.

PROP. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject

to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

Proof.--Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind

contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea

indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than

the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).

Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,

in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;

therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,

subject to emotions which are attributable to passions. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual

love is eternal.

Note.--If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that

they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that

they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the

imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after

death.

PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual

love.

Proof.--God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.

Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;

and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of

himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:

now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as

intellectual love.

PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is

that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as

he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the

essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;

in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is

part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Proof.--This love of the mind must be referred to the

activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is

itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself

accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);

that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity

whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human

mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;

therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of

the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves

himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God

towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God

are identical.

Note.--From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein

our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in

the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love

towards men. This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called

Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love be referred

to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of

spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really

distinguished from glory. In so far as it is referred to God, it

is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,

accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is

referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).

Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in

knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.

xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner

and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from

the divine nature and constantly depends on God. I have thought

it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show

by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I

have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),

is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which

I have styled knowledge of the second kind. For, although in

Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and

consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence

and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate

and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind

so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual

essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.

PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to

this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Proof.--This intellectual love follows necessarily from the

nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through

the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).

If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary

to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;

consequently, that, which should be able to take away this

love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious

absurdity. Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.

Q.E.D.

Note.--The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular

things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given

time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.

PROP. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things

by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to

those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.

Proof.--The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);

therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by

the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the

part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently

(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not

touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in

other words, evil (IV. xxx.). Thus, in proportion as the mind

understands more things by the second and third kinds of

knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains

unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.

Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in

IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;

namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the

mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,

consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more. Again,

since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest

possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind

can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which

we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of

little importance when compared with the part which endures. But

I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.

PROP. XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest

number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part

is eternal.

Proof.--He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest

number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which

are evil (IV. xxxviii.)--that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions

which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he

possesses the power of arranging and associating the

modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,

and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the

modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;

whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected

with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute

the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man

will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal. Q.E.D.

Note.--Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number

of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a

nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great

knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or

chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely

fear death. But, in order that this may be understood more

clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of

perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the

better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.

For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a

corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,

if we have been able to live through the whole period of life

with a sound mind in a sound body. And, in reality, he, who, as

in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very

few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external

causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely

conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who

has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,

considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of

God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we primarily

endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far

as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into

something else capable of very many activities, and referable to

a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;

and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its

imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison

with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the

last Proposition.

PROP. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of

perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice

versâ, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

Proof.--In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it

possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.

iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less

passive. This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove

that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more

perfect. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the part of the mind which

endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.

For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the

understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);

the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.

xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.

and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it

great or small, is more perfect than the latter. Q.E.D.

Note.--Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set

forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without

relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other

places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,

is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another

eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to

infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the

eternal and infinite intellect of God.

PROP. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we

should still consider as of primary importance piety and

religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed

to be attributable to courage and high--mindedness.

Proof.--The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule

of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's

own true interest. Now, while we determined what reason

prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,

which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part. Although

we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we

nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage

and high--mindedness are of primary importance. Therefore, even

if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the

aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place. Q.E.D.

Note.--The general belief of the multitude seems to be

different. Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so

far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their

rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the

commandments of the divine law. They therefore believe that

piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to

firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to

lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,

for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but

also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after

death, that they are induced to live according to the divine

commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry

them.

If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the

mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life

remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of

piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling

everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey

fortune rather than themselves. Such a course appears to me not

less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he

can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to

cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he

sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer

to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of

reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth

refuting.

PROP. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue

itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our

lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able

to control our lusts.

Proof.--Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and

note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.

xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be

referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;

therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself. This was our

first point. Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in

this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand

(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power

has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is

it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in

proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or

blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts. And,

since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in

the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in

blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,

contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this

blessedness itself. Q.E.D.

Note.--I have thus completed all I wished to set forth

touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's

freedom. Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how

much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his

lusts. For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various

ways by external causes without ever gaining the true

acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were

unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as

he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is

scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of

himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal

necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true

acquiescence of his spirit.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result

seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs

must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be

possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without

great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men

neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are

rare.

End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza

[1] "Affectiones"

[2] "Forma"

[3] "Animata"

[4] A Baconian phrase. Nov. Org. Aph. 100. [Pollock, p. 126, n.]

[5] Conscientiæ morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men

whom we regard without any particular emotion.

[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch version and Camerer read,

"an internal cause." "Honor" = Gloria.

[8] See previous endnote.

[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5. Spinoza transposes the verses.

 "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;

 Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."

[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine

intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.

[11] Gloria.

[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."

[13] Honestas

[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I

have translated above. He suggests as alternative readings to

'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).

[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).

Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi

alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious

misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris

boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)

[16] Continuo. Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground

that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.

I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be

obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.

[17] Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus----emotions.

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